# 1NC

## off

### 1NC---OFF

#### Interp---judges should require debaters to evangelize in the 1AC

Paul Cresswell 14 {Devoted Christian. April 2014. “Preaching – The Moral Imperative.” [https://thelampstand.com.au/preaching-the-moral-imperative/}//JM](https://thelampstand.com.au/preaching-the-moral-imperative/%7d//JM)

Reasons to preach It is axiomatic that those who love the Truth will want to tell others about it. There are two reasons for this. Firstly, what is foremost in our minds will come out. As it is written, “out of the abundance of the heart the mouth speaketh” (Matt 12:34). Secondly, every believer is under an obligation to preach the Gospel. All Bible readers soon become aware that there are quite a number of Scripture passages which refer to the necessity of preaching. In fact, as the last verse in hymn 344 puts it: “Ye who have the truth received, By God’s grace to you revealed; Should you dare to keep it back, You the rich reward may lack”. The foolishness of preaching On the other hand, we might wonder why we bother to preach when no one is interested today – and it is to be admitted that lack of interest is disheartening – and in any case, it is sometimes argued, it is God who calls. But then, Paul wrote to Timothy, “I charge thee therefore before God, and the Lord Jesus Christ, who shall judge the quick and the dead at his appearing and his kingdom; Preach the word; be instant in season, out of season; reprove, rebuke, exhort with all long suffering and doctrine … But watch thou in all things, endure afflictions, do the work of an evangelist, make full proof of thy ministry” (2 Tim 4:1–5). Paul also wrote to the ecclesia at Corinth, “For the preaching of the cross is to them that perish foolishness; but unto us which are [being] saved it is the power of God … For after that in the wisdom of God the world by wisdom knew not God, it pleased God by the foolishness of preaching to save them that believe” (1 Cor 1:18, 21). To the modern mind preaching might seem foolishness, but it is God’s way! The command to preach Our Lord Jesus Christ who “came into Galilee, preaching the gospel of the Kingdom of God,” left a commandment to his disciples to do likewise saying, “Go ye into all the world, and preach the gospel to every creature. He that believeth and is baptized shall be saved; but he that believeth not, shall be condemned” (Mark 1:14; 16:15–16). The effect of first century preaching was that the Gospel did go into all the world (Col 1:6, 23; Matt 24:14). Surely the Lord’s words to preach the Gospel, and the confirmation that the apostles (meaning ‘ones sent’) did just that, serves as an example and motivation for us to do the same in our generation. Our Lord warned his disciples: “If the world hate you, ye know that it hated me before it hated you. If ye were of the world, the world would love his own: but because ye are not of the world, but I have chosen you out of the world, therefore the world hateth you. Remember the word that I said unto you, The servant is not greater than his lord. If they have persecuted me, they will also persecute you; if they have kept my saying, they will keep yours also. But all these things will they do unto you for my name’s sake, because they know not him that sent me” (John 15:18–21). That the disciples did meet violent opposition to their preaching did not deter them (Acts 5:41; 8:4; 11:20). So why are we often so faint hearted when we do not meet violent opposition, but only indifference? To a man who made excuse when Christ asked him to follow him, Christ said, “go thou and preach the kingdom of God” (Luke 9:60). And so we should! Without excuse! The preacher said, “Cast thy bread upon the waters: for thou shalt find it after many days” (Eccl 11:1). We are searching for those who are disinterested and will give the word a hearing. Yes, it’s true God calls; we do not, but He calls people through His word that we must put before them. He “manifests his word through preaching” (Tit 1:3) “and this is the word which by the gospel is preached unto you” (1 Pet 1:25). Love is also a motive Do we preach just because it is a command or is there something more? If God so loved the world that He gave His only begotten Son, should we not be motivated to preach because we love? Paul and Peter both speak of preaching motivated by love. Paul says, “Some indeed preach Christ even of envy and strife; and some also of goodwill: The one preach Christ of contention, not sincerely, supposing to add affliction to my bonds: but the other of love, knowing that I am set for the defence of the gospel” (Phil 1:15–17). Peter writes, “The Lord is not slack concerning his promise, as some men count slackness; but is longsuffering to us-ward, not willing that any should perish, but that all should come to repentance” (2 Pet 3:9). Judgment We live in similar days to those of Noah. Judgment is soon to come upon this evil world as it did upon his. Despite Noah’s lack of ‘success’ in his preaching, he was nevertheless commended for being “a preacher of righteousness” (2 Pet 2:5). There is a lesson in that for us! Paul is constrained to ask the question, “How then shall they call on him in whom they have not believed? And how shall they believe in him of whom they have not heard? And how shall they hear without a preacher?” In those early days of the apostles’ preaching, “their sound went into all the earth, and their words unto the ends of the world” (Rom 10:14, 18). But those preachers have long ago passed off the scene. We inherit their hope, and with it their preaching responsibilities. Where do converts come from? Today the majority of those who embrace the Truth come from our own families. Few in Western societies come to the Truth by preaching because it is the last days, not the first; but some people do, including myself. In fact there is unprecedented response to the Truth around the world at the present time, though not so much in Western countries except for immigrants, often of Asian origin. Just observe the keen interest by Chinese and other nationalities in Australia. God is still calling from the nations a people for His name (Acts 15:14–17). If we do not continue our preaching activities and take our children to them, then we cannot expect them to be baptized when older. Nor will they be baptized if we do not treat our children as we would treat any other interested friend, but drive them away from the Truth by ill-considered remarks or treatment. The power of example The fact is that, like Israel who were to be “a kingdom of priests, and an holy nation” (Exod 19:6), we are to be living witnesses to the God who has called us to be His servants. And a great honour it is to be His servants. As Peter put it, “But ye are a chosen generation, a royal priesthood, an holy nation, a peculiar people; that ye should show forth the praises of him who hath called you out of darkness into his marvellous light” (1 Pet 2:9). As with Israel, the witness of a God-honouring life is a necessary part of preaching. We are all aware that the best teachers do so by both word and example. If we do not support our preaching efforts by attending in person, we are not setting a good example to anyone, and especially not to our children. Importantly, by our preaching, even if few are converted, we are preparing the world for the coming of the Lord and submission to him in that day when:“They that be wise (mg. teachers) shall shine as the brightness of the firmament; and they that turn many to righteousness as the stars for ever and ever” (Dan 12:3).

#### Vote down speech acts that defy god’s will---otherwise you go to hell

GQ 21 (GotQuestions?, <https://www.gotquestions.org/who-will-go-to-hell.html>, EM)

Hell is mentioned 167 times in the Bible, sometimes called Gehenna, Hades, the pit, the Abyss, or everlasting punishment ([Proverbs 7:27](https://biblia.com/bible/esv/Prov%207.27); [Luke 8:31](https://biblia.com/bible/esv/Luke%208.31); [10:15](https://biblia.com/bible/esv/Luke%2010.15); [2 Thessalonians 1:9](https://biblia.com/bible/esv/2%20Thess%201.9)). Jesus spoke of heaven and hell as real places ([Matthew 13:41–42](https://biblia.com/bible/esv/Matt%2013.41%E2%80%9342); [23:33](https://biblia.com/bible/esv/Matthew%2023.33); [Mark 9:43–47](https://biblia.com/bible/esv/Mark%209.43%E2%80%9347); [Luke 12:5](https://biblia.com/bible/esv/Luke%2012.5)). The story Jesus told about the rich man and Lazarus was an actual event that demonstrated the reality of the two eternal destinations ([Luke 16:19–31](https://biblia.com/bible/esv/Luke%2016.19%E2%80%9331)). Heaven is the dwelling place of God ([2 Chronicles 30:27](https://biblia.com/bible/esv/2%20Chron%2030.27)) where Jesus has gone to “prepare a place” for those who love Him ([John 14:2](https://biblia.com/bible/esv/John%2014.2)). Hell was created for “the devil and his angels” ([Matthew 25:41](https://biblia.com/bible/esv/Matt%2025.41)). But because every human being is a sinner, every person past the age of accountability has already been condemned to hell ([Romans 3:10](https://biblia.com/bible/esv/Rom%203.10); [5:12](https://biblia.com/bible/esv/Romans%205.12); [John 3:18](https://biblia.com/bible/esv/John%203.18)). We all deserve hell as the just punishment for our rebellion against God ([Romans 6:23](https://biblia.com/bible/esv/Rom%206.23)). Jesus was clear that “no one can see the kingdom of God unless they are born again” ([John 3:3](https://biblia.com/bible/esv/John%203.3)). He was also clear that hell is an eternal punishment for those who do not obey Him ([Matthew 25:46](https://biblia.com/bible/esv/Matt%2025.46)). [Second Thessalonians 1:8–9](https://biblia.com/bible/esv/2%20Thess%201.8%E2%80%939) says that in the end God “will punish those who do not know God and do not obey the gospel of our Lord Jesus. They will be punished with everlasting destruction and shut out from the presence of the Lord and from the glory of his might.” John the Baptist said about Jesus, “His winnowing fork is in his hand, and he will clear his threshing floor, gathering his wheat into the barn and burning up the chaff with unquenchable fire” ([Matthew 3:12](https://biblia.com/bible/esv/Matt%203.12)). [John 3:18](https://biblia.com/bible/esv/John%203.18) explains in the simplest terms who will go to heaven and who will go to hell: “Whoever believes in him is not condemned, but whoever does not believe stands condemned already because they have not believed in the name of God’s one and only Son.” So, those who go to hell are specifically those who do not believe in Jesus’ name. To “believe” goes beyond a mental recognition of the truth. To believe in Christ for salvation requires a transfer of allegiance. We stop worshiping ourselves, we forsake our sin, and we begin to worship God with our heart, soul, mind, and strength ([Matthew 22:36–37](https://biblia.com/bible/esv/Matt%2022.36%E2%80%9337); [Mark 12:30](https://biblia.com/bible/esv/Mark%2012.30)). God desires that every person spend eternity with Him ([Matthew 18:14](https://biblia.com/bible/esv/Matt%2018.14); [2 Peter 3:9](https://biblia.com/bible/esv/2%20Pet%203.9)), but He honors our free will ([John 4:14](https://biblia.com/bible/esv/John%204.14)). Anyone who so desires can go to heaven ([John 1:12](https://biblia.com/bible/esv/John%201.12)). Jesus already paid the price for our salvation, but we must accept that gift and transfer ownership of our lives to Him ([Luke 9:23](https://biblia.com/bible/esv/Luke%209.23)). Heaven is perfect, and God cannot take anyone there who insists on holding on to his or her sin. We must allow Him to cleanse us of our sin and make us righteous in His sight ([2 Corinthians 5:21](https://biblia.com/bible/esv/2%20Cor%205.21)). [John 1:10–12](https://biblia.com/bible/esv/John%201.10%E2%80%9312) shows us the problem and the solution: “He was in the world, and though the world was made through him, the world did not recognize him. He came to that which was his own, but his own did not receive him. Yet to all who did receive him, to those who believed in his name, he gave the right to become children of God.” We can choose to trust in Jesus’ payment for our sin, or we can choose to pay for our sins ourselves—but we must remember that the payment for our sin is eternity in hell. C. S. Lewis said it this way: “There are only two kinds of people in the end: those who say to God, ‘Thy will be done,’ and those to whom God says in the end, ‘Thy will be done.’”

#### Christianity is true---overwhelming historical evidence

Sinclair 20 - Rector of Church of the Messiah in the heart of urban Ottawa. He was the Chair of Essentials Canada and founding Chair of his denomination (ANiC). He currently serves as the Chair of the ANiC task force to make ANiC more deeply biblical at every level. (George, <https://ca.thegospelcoalition.org/article/10-concise-pieces-of-evidence-for-the-resurrection/>, EM)

For your consideration, the following is a concise statement of the pieces of evidence for the real, true, historical resurrection of Jesus Messiah.

1. There are four ancient biographies of Jesus. They were all written by eyewitnesses and/or based on eyewitness testimony. They were written and circulated while many other eyewitnesses were still alive. These biographies all say that Jesus rose from the dead. These biographies are supplemented by letters written by eyewitnesses while many other eyewitnesses were still alive. These ancient letters claim that Jesus died by crucifixion and that on the third Jesus rose from the dead.

2. Pagan and Jewish writers report that Christians believed Jesus rose from the dead.

3. Many of the principal eyewitnesses to the resurrection of Jesus died because of their claim that Jesus was resurrected. Their lives would probably have been spared if they recanted. This is very significant. We know that people will die for a cause. But these men and women died for a set of facts. They went to their grave rather than say that the facts were untrue. They died because they said the facts of the crucifixion and resurrection of Jesus were true.

4. The eyewitness story told by John is very important. Many people today will claim that John’s story (like the other eyewitness stories) is meant to be understood as a story of symbol and metaphor. However we know that John clearly understood the difference between telling an historical story and telling a story overflowing with symbol and metaphor. Why? Because he wrote two books, one that very clearly claims to be historical (we now know this book as The Gospel of John) and one book that is clearly all about symbol and metaphor (we now know this as The Book of Revelation). So, John is an important witness of what happened in the death and resurrection of Jesus.

5. The historical evidence shows that: the grave was empty; the grave clothes were neatly left behind; the stone enclosing the tomb was rolled away; the body of Jesus was never found; the grave had been guarded by Roman soldiers; and no one ever claimed to have stolen the body. The presence of the grave clothes are significant. It was the spices attached to the cloth that had value. Anyone removing the body for profit or mischief would have taken the wrapped body away and separated out the valuable mixture at their leisure. In fact the placement of the grave clothes, like the placement of the stone, perfectly fits with the resurrection as the cause, rather than with human agency as the cause.

6. There are (not counting Paul), eleven recorded times that Jesus appeared to people proving that He was resurrected. These appearances were to: men and women, individuals, couples, groups, and at least one crowd. The appearances were inside and outside, in different locations, and at different times of the day. He was physically touched, audibly heard, visually seen, and He ate food in the presence of witnesses. None of these witnesses believed that Jesus would rise from the dead before He rose from the dead. All of them knew him before His death, so they knew He was the same Jesus who died on the cross.

7. In the very place where Jesus died and was buried there was an explosion of growth in the Christian movement – which was centred on the claim that the grave was empty and that Jesus had truly risen. This explosion of growth happened mere weeks after the death and resurrection of Jesus in the place where He died. The growth happened in the face of hostility, opposition and persecution from civil and religious leaders.

8. The death and resurrection of Jesus was not a random event. Jesus predicted that He would die by crucifixion, be buried, and rise from the dead. His prediction that He would die from crucifixion is very significant. He could not control that. Crucifixion was a means of death reserved to the imperial Roman authorities. Jesus claimed, reasonably, that His death by crucifixion and His resurrection on the third day would be a “sign” that vindicated who He was, what He taught, and what He would accomplish by His death and resurrection.

9. The death and resurrection of Jesus also took place in the context of centuries of prophecy that such a Messiah would come from God, and die and rise. Jesus Himself claimed that His life, death and resurrection was a fulfillment of these prophecies.

10. There is more. The death and resurrection of Jesus takes place in the context of an overarching story that has deep and powerful insights into the human condition. His life, death and resurrection took place in the context of a body of writings that have proved for millennia to be wise and insightful about the human condition. These writings have been the basis for the development of science, human rights, and good government. The life, death and resurrection of Jesus took place in the context of a worldview that is unsurpassed in its breadth, depth, coherence, consistency and emotional and rational power.

Friends, consider Jesus, Crucified Risen Saviour, loving Lord. Come to Him with humble trust.

### 1NC---OFF

#### Vote neg on presumption:

#### 1--- their predictions rely on the validity of inductive inference - but *anti-induction* is equally well founded - plan is just as likely to be bad

SEP 19 (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/induction-problem/, EM)

Hume asks on what grounds we come to our beliefs about the unobserved on the basis of inductive inferences. He presents an argument in the form of a dilemma which appears to rule out the possibility of any reasoning from the premises to the conclusion of an inductive inference. There are, he says, two possible types of arguments, “demonstrative” and “probable”, but neither will serve. A demonstrative argument produces the wrong kind of conclusion, and a probable argument would be circular. Therefore, for Hume, the problem remains of how to explain why we form any conclusions that go beyond the past instances of which we have had experience (T. 1.3.6.10). Hume stresses that he is not disputing that we do draw such inferences. The challenge, as he sees it, is to understand the “foundation” of the inference—the “logic” or “process of argument” that it is based upon (E. 4.2.21). The problem of meeting this challenge, while evading Hume’s argument against the possibility of doing so, has become known as “the problem of induction”. Hume’s argument is one of the most famous in philosophy. A number of philosophers have attempted solutions to the problem, but a significant number have embraced his conclusion that it is insoluble. There is also a wide spectrum of opinion on the significance of the problem. Some have argued that Hume’s argument does not establish any far-reaching skeptical conclusion, either because it was never intended to, or because the argument is in some way misformulated. Yet many have regarded it as one of the most profound philosophical challenges imaginable since it seems to call into question the justification of one of the most fundamental ways in which we form knowledge. Bertrand Russell, for example, expressed the view that if Hume’s problem cannot be solved, “there is no intellectual difference between sanity and insanity”

#### 2---many worlds theory is true---means the aff is not inherent

Powell 19 (Corey, <https://www.nbcnews.com/mach/science/weirdest-idea-quantum-physics-catching-there-may-be-endless-worlds-ncna1068706>, EM)

Ever wonder what would have happened if you'd taken up the "Hey, let's get coffee" offer from that cool classmate you once had? If you believe some of today’s top physicists, such questions are more than idle what-ifs. Maybe a version of you in another world did go on that date, and is now celebrating your 10th wedding anniversary. The idea that there are multiple versions of you, existing across worlds too numerous to count, is a long way from our intuitive experience. It sure looks and feels like each of us is just one person living just one life, waking up every day in the same, one-and-only world. But according to an increasingly popular analysis of quantum mechanics known as the “[many worlds interpretation](https://urldefense.com/v3/__https:/plato.stanford.edu/entries/qm-manyworlds/__;!c3kmrbLBmhXtig!7R0VCJPvzByJzznSQY7gFCLBlF85Vk5M6Uf3Tzv-_wJEZSNqbcef1oQ63GS63sFafj4$),” every fundamental event that has multiple possible outcomes — whether it’s a particle of light hitting Mars or a molecule in the flame bouncing off your teapot — splits the world into alternate realities. Even to seasoned scientists, it’s odd to think that the universe splits apart depending on whether a molecule bounces this way or that way. It’s odder still to realize that a similar splitting could occur for every interaction taking place in the [quantum world](https://www.nbcnews.com/mach/science/google-claims-quantum-computing-breakthrough-ibm-pushes-back-ncna1070461). Things get downright bizarre when you realize that all those subatomic splits would also apply to bigger things, including ourselves. Maybe there’s a world in which a version of you split off and bought a winning lottery ticket. Or maybe in another, you tripped at the top of a cliff and fell to your death — oops. “It's absolutely possible that there are multiple worlds where you made different decisions. We're just obeying the laws of physics,” says Sean Carroll, a theoretical physicist at the California Institute of Technology and the author of a new book on many worlds titled "Something Deeply Hidden." Just how many versions of you might there be? “We don't know whether the number of worlds is finite or infinite, but it's certainly a very large number," Carroll says. "There’s no way it’s, like, five.” Carroll is aware that the many worlds interpretation sounds like something plucked from a science fiction movie. (It doesn’t help that he was an adviser on "Avengers: Endgame.") And like a Hollywood blockbuster, the many worlds interpretation attracts both passionate fans and scathing critics. Renowned theorist Roger Penrose of Oxford University dismisses the idea as “reductio ad absurdum”: physics reduced to absurdity. On the other hand, Penrose’s former collaborator, the late Stephen Hawking, [described](https://books.google.com/books?id=qjYbQ7EBAKwC&pg=PA345&lpg=PA345&dq=%22self-evidently+correct%22+hawking+many+worlds&source=bl&ots=F9WTAkliQA&sig=ACfU3U26vRO7r38BkcZbgTvWnMf0yN05hQ&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwjquoTgkK3lAhVhkeAKHZFJDZsQ6AEwCnoECAcQAQ#v=) the many worlds interpretation as “self-evidently true.” Carroll himself is comfortable with the idea that he’s but one of many Sean Carrolls running around in alternate versions of reality. “The concept of a single person extending from birth to death was always just a useful approximation,” he writes in his new book, and to him the many worlds interpretation merely extends that idea: “The world duplicates, and everything within the world goes along with it.” The mind-bending saga of the many worlds interpretation began in 1926, when Austrian physicist Erwin Schrödinger [mathematically demonstrated](https://plus.maths.org/content/schrodinger-1) that the subatomic world is fundamentally blurry. In the familiar, human-scale reality, an object exists in one well-defined place: Place your phone on your bedside table, and that’s the only spot it can be, whether or not you're looking for it. But in the quantum realm, objects exist in a smudge of probability, snapping into focus only when observed. “Before you look at an object, whether it's an electron, or an atom or whatever, it's not in any definite location,” Carroll says. “It might be more likely that you observe it in one place or another, but it's not actually located at any particular place.” Nearly a century of experimentation has confirmed that, strange as it seems, this phenomenon is a core aspect of the physical world. Even Einstein struggled with the notion: What happened to all of the other possible locations where the object could have been, and all the other different outcomes that could have ensued? Why should an object’s behavior depend on whether or not somebody was looking at it? In 1957, a Princeton student named [Hugh Everett III](https://space.mit.edu/home/tegmark/everett/everett.html) came up with a radical explanation. He proposed that all possible outcomes really do occur — but that only a single version plays out in the world we inhabit. All the other possibilities split off from us, each giving rise to its own separate world. Nothing ever goes to waste, in this view, since everything that can happen does happen in some world.

#### 3---there is no epistemically virtuous chain of justification---foundationalism, coherentism, circular reasoning, and infinitism are all deficient

SEP 19 (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/skepticism/#PyrrSkep>, EM)

Agrippa’s trilemma, then, can be presented thus:

If a belief is justified, then it is either a basic justified belief or an inferentially justified belief.

There are no basic justified beliefs.

Therefore, If a belief is justified, then it is justified in virtue of belonging to an inferential chain.

All inferential chains are such that either (a) they contain an infinite number of beliefs; or (b) they contain circles; or (c) they contain beliefs that are not justified.

No belief is justified in virtue of belonging to an infinite inferential chain.

No belief is justified in virtue of belonging to a circular inferential chain.

No belief is justified in virtue of belonging to an inferential chain that contains unjustified beliefs.

Therefore, There are no justified beliefs.

### 1NC---OFF

#### Vote neg - P =/= NP - insert the proof

Vega 16 (Frank, A Simple Proof of P versus NP, EM)

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### 1NC---OFF

#### The United States federal government should remove its prohibitions and eliminate the scope of its laws, transferring its resources and authority to a new futarchic government.

#### The United States futarchic government should substantially increase its prohibitions of anticompetitive vessel sharing agreements involving the acquisition, use, and sharing of mega-ships above 10,000 TEU capacity in container shipping.

#### Solves the aff better and extinction

Tabarrok 14 Alex Tabarrok, 5-13-2014, "Should the Future Get a Vote?," Marginal REVOLUTION, https://marginalrevolution.com/marginalrevolution/2014/05/should-the-future-get-a-vote.html

Philosopher Thomas Wells argues that [future citizens need the vote today](http://aeon.co/magazine/living-together/a-mechanism-to-give-future-citizens-the-vote/): …future generations must accept whatever we choose to bequeath them, and they have no way of informing us of their values. In this, they are even more helpless than foreigners, on whom our political decisions about pollution, trade, war and so on are similarly imposed without consent. Disenfranchised as they are, such foreigners can at least petition their own governments to tell ours off, or engage with us directly by writing articles in our newspapers about the justice of their cause. The citizens of the future lack even this recourse. The asymmetry between past and future is more than unfair. Our ancestors are beyond harm; they cannot know if we disappoint them. Yet the political decisions we make today will do more than just determine the burdens of citizenship for our grandchildren. They also concern existential dangers such as the likelihood of pandemics and environmental collapse. Without a presence in our political system, the plight of future citizens who might suffer or gain from our present political decisions cannot be properly weighed. We need to give them a voice. But how can we solve this problem? Wells has some very good insights: If current citizens can’t help but be short-sighted, perhaps we should consider introducing agents who can vote in a far-seeing and impartial way. They would need to be credibly motivated to defend the basic interests of future generations as a whole, rather than certain favoured subsets, and they would require the expertise to calculate the long-term actuarial implications of government policies. But then his solution turns laughable: Such voters would have to be more than human. I am thinking of civic organisations, such as charitable foundations, environmentalist advocacy groups or non-partisan think tanks. Well’s solution (give these groups votes) is so tied to his conception of what the “enlightened” future will bring that it clearly fails the far-seeing, impartiality, credibly motivated and expertise requirements that he outlines as desirable. We need not conclude, however, that Well’s plea is disingenuous or impossible but we do need a better implementation. Robin Hanson’s government of prediction markets (“[futarchy](http://hanson.gmu.edu/futarchy.html)“) is a better approach. It is know well understood that relative to other institutions prediction markets draw on expertise to produce predictions that are [far seeing](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0169207008000320) and [impartial](http://hanson.gmu.edu/biashelp.pdf). What is less well understood is that through a suitable choice of what is to be traded, prediction markets can be designed to be credibly motivated by a variety of goals including the interests of future generations. To understand futarchy note that a prediction market in future GDP would be a good predictor of future GDP. Thus, if all we cared about was future GDP, a good rule would be to pass a policy if prediction markets estimate that future GDP will be higher with the policy than without the policy. Of course, we care about more than future GDP; perhaps we also care about environmental quality, risk, inequality, liberty and so forth. What Hanson’s futarchy proposes is to incorporate all these ideas into a weighted measure of welfare. Prediction markets would then be used to predict and make policy choices based on future welfare. Incorporated within the measure of welfare could be factors like environmental quality many years into the future. Note, however, that even this assumes that we know what people in the future will care about. Here then is the final [meta-twist](http://inception.davepedu.com/). We can also incorporate into our measure of welfare predictions of how future generations will define welfare. We could, for example, choose a rule such that we will pass policies that increase future environmental quality unless a prediction market in future definitions of welfare suggests that future generations will change their welfare standards. It sounds complicated but then so is the problem. In short, more than any other form of government, futarchy is based on far seeing, impartial, expertise driven and credibly motivated predictions of future welfare and it is flexible enough to allow for a wide definition of welfare including taking into account the interests of future generations.

#### Their experts are reverse qualified - presumption

Menand 5 – Louis Menand has contributed to The New Yorker since 1991 and has been a staff writer since 2001. His book “The Metaphysical Club” was awarded the 2002 Pulitzer Prize for history and the Francis Parkman Prize from the Society of American Historians. He was an associate editor at The New Republic from 1986 to 1987, an editor at The New Yorker from 1992 to 1993, and a contributing editor at The New York Review of Books from 1994 to 2001. He is the Lee Simpkins Family Professor of Arts and Sciences and the Anne T. and Robert M. Bass Professor of English at Harvard University. In 2016, he was awarded the National Humanities Medal by President Obama, November 28th ("Everybody’S an Expert", New Yorker, Available online at https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2005/12/05/everybodys-an-expert, Accessed 11-10-2020)

It is the somewhat gratifying lesson of Philip Tetlock’s new book, “Expert Political Judgment: How Good Is It? How Can We Know?” (Princeton; $35), that people who make prediction their business—people who appear as experts on television, get quoted in newspaper articles, advise governments and businesses, and participate in punditry roundtables—are no better than the rest of us. When they’re wrong, they’re rarely held accountable, and they rarely admit it, either. They insist that they were just off on timing, or blindsided by an improbable event, or almost right, or wrong for the right reasons. They have the same repertoire of self-justifications that everyone has, and are no more inclined than anyone else to revise their beliefs about the way the world works, or ought to work, just because they made a mistake. No one is paying you for your gratuitous opinions about other people, but the experts are being paid, and Tetlock claims that the better known and more frequently quoted they are, the less reliable their guesses about the future are likely to be. The accuracy of an expert’s predictions actually has an inverse relationship to his or her self-confidence, renown, and, beyond a certain point, depth of knowledge. People who follow current events by reading the papers and newsmagazines regularly can guess what is likely to happen about as accurately as the specialists whom the papers quote. Our system of expertise is completely inside out: it rewards bad judgments over good ones. “Expert Political Judgment” is not a work of media criticism. Tetlock is a psychologist—he teaches at Berkeley—and his conclusions are based on a long-term study that he began twenty years ago. He picked two hundred and eighty-four people who made their living “commenting or offering advice on political and economic trends,” and he started asking them to assess the probability that various things would or would not come to pass, both in the areas of the world in which they specialized and in areas about which they were not expert. Would there be a nonviolent end to apartheid in South Africa? Would Gorbachev be ousted in a coup? Would the United States go to war in the Persian Gulf? Would Canada disintegrate? (Many experts believed that it would, on the ground that Quebec would succeed in seceding.) And so on. By the end of the study, in 2003, the experts had made 82,361 forecasts. Tetlock also asked questions designed to determine how they reached their judgments, how they reacted when their predictions proved to be wrong, how they evaluated new information that did not support their views, and how they assessed the probability that rival theories and predictions were accurate. Tetlock got a statistical handle on his task by putting most of the forecasting questions into a “three possible futures” form. The respondents were asked to rate the probability of three alternative outcomes: the persistence of the status quo, more of something (political freedom, economic growth), or less of something (repression, recession). And he measured his experts on two dimensions: how good they were at guessing probabilities (did all the things they said had an x per cent chance of happening happen x per cent of the time?), and how accurate they were at predicting specific outcomes. The results were unimpressive. On the first scale, the experts performed worse than they would have if they had simply assigned an equal probability to all three outcomes—if they had given each possible future a thirty-three-per-cent chance of occurring. Human beings who spend their lives studying the state of the world, in other words, are poorer forecasters than dart-throwing monkeys, who would have distributed their picks evenly over the three choices. Tetlock also found that specialists are not significantly more reliable than non-specialists in guessing what is going to happen in the region they study. Knowing a little might make someone a more reliable forecaster, but Tetlock found that knowing a lot can actually make a person less reliable. “We reach the point of diminishing marginal predictive returns for knowledge disconcertingly quickly,” he reports. “In this age of academic hyperspecialization, there is no reason for supposing that contributors to top journals—distinguished political scientists, area study specialists, economists, and so on—are any better than journalists or attentive readers of the New York Times in ‘reading’ emerging situations.” And the more famous the forecaster the more overblown the forecasts. “Experts in demand,” Tetlock says, “were more overconfident than their colleagues who eked out existences far from the limelight.” People who are not experts in the psychology of expertise are likely (I predict) to find Tetlock’s results a surprise and a matter for concern. For psychologists, though, nothing could be less surprising. “Expert Political Judgment” is just one of more than a hundred studies that have pitted experts against statistical or actuarial formulas, and in almost all of those studies the people either do no better than the formulas or do worse. In one study, college counsellors were given information about a group of high-school students and asked to predict their freshman grades in college. The counsellors had access to test scores, grades, the results of personality and vocational tests, and personal statements from the students, whom they were also permitted to interview. Predictions that were produced by a formula using just test scores and grades were more accurate. There are also many studies showing that expertise and experience do not make someone a better reader of the evidence. In one, data from a test used to diagnose brain damage were given to a group of clinical psychologists and their secretaries. The psychologists’ diagnoses were no better than the secretaries’. The experts’ trouble in Tetlock’s study is exactly the trouble that all human beings have: we fall in love with our hunches, and we really, really hate to be wrong. Tetlock describes an experiment that he witnessed thirty years ago in a Yale classroom. A rat was put in a T-shaped maze. Food was placed in either the right or the left transept of the T in a random sequence such that, over the long run, the food was on the left sixty per cent of the time and on the right forty per cent. Neither the students nor (needless to say) the rat was told these frequencies. The students were asked to predict on which side of the T the food would appear each time. The rat eventually figured out that the food was on the left side more often than the right, and it therefore nearly always went to the left, scoring roughly sixty per cent—D, but a passing grade. The students looked for patterns of left-right placement, and ended up scoring only fifty-two per cent, an F. The rat, having no reputation to begin with, was not embarrassed about being wrong two out of every five tries. But Yale students, who do have reputations, searched for a hidden order in the sequence. They couldn’t deal with forty-per-cent error, so they ended up with almost fifty-per-cent error. The expert-prediction game is not much different. When television pundits make predictions, the more ingenious their forecasts the greater their cachet. An arresting new prediction means that the expert has discovered a set of interlocking causes that no one else has spotted, and that could lead to an outcome that the conventional wisdom is ignoring. On shows like “The McLaughlin Group,” these experts never lose their reputations, or their jobs, because long shots are their business. More serious commentators differ from the pundits only in the degree of showmanship. These serious experts—the think tankers and area-studies professors—are not entirely out to entertain, but they are a little out to entertain, and both their status as experts and their appeal as performers require them to predict futures that are not obvious to the viewer. The producer of the show does not want you and me to sit there listening to an expert and thinking, I could have said that. The expert also suffers from knowing too much: the more facts an expert has, the more information is available to be enlisted in support of his or her pet theories, and the more chains of causation he or she can find beguiling. This helps explain why specialists fail to outguess non-specialists. The odds tend to be with the obvious. Tetlock’s experts were also no different from the rest of us when it came to learning from their mistakes. Most people tend to dismiss new information that doesn’t fit with what they already believe. Tetlock found that his experts used a double standard: they were much tougher in assessing the validity of information that undercut their theory than they were in crediting information that supported it. The same deficiency leads liberals to read only The Nation and conservatives to read only National Review. We are not natural falsificationists: we would rather find more reasons for believing what we already believe than look for reasons that we might be wrong. In the terms of Karl Popper’s famous example, to verify our intuition that all swans are white we look for lots more white swans, when what we should really be looking for is one black swan. Also, people tend to see the future as indeterminate and the past as inevitable. If you look backward, the dots that lead up to Hitler or the fall of the Soviet Union or the attacks on September 11th all connect. If you look forward, it’s just a random scatter of dots, many potential chains of causation leading to many possible outcomes. We have no idea today how tomorrow’s invasion of a foreign land is going to go; after the invasion, we can actually persuade ourselves that we knew all along. The result seems inevitable, and therefore predictable. Tetlock found that, consistent with this asymmetry, experts routinely misremembered the degree of probability they had assigned to an event after it came to pass. They claimed to have predicted what happened with a higher degree of certainty than, according to the record, they really did. When this was pointed out to them, by Tetlock’s researchers, they sometimes became defensive. And, like most of us, experts violate a fundamental rule of probabilities by tending to find scenarios with more variables more likely. If a prediction needs two independent things to happen in order for it to be true, its probability is the product of the probability of each of the things it depends on. If there is a one-in-three chance of x and a one-in-four chance of y, the probability of both x and y occurring is one in twelve. But we often feel instinctively that if the two events “fit together” in some scenario the chance of both is greater, not less. The classic “Linda problem” is an analogous case. In this experiment, subjects are told, “Linda is thirty-one years old, single, outspoken, and very bright. She majored in philosophy. As a student, she was deeply concerned with issues of discrimination and social justice and also participated in antinuclear demonstrations.” They are then asked to rank the probability of several possible descriptions of Linda today. Two of them are “bank teller” and “bank teller and active in the feminist movement.” People rank the second description higher than the first, even though, logically, its likelihood is smaller, because it requires two things to be true—that Linda is a bank teller and that Linda is an active feminist—rather than one. Plausible detail makes us believers. When subjects were given a choice between an insurance policy that covered hospitalization for any reason and a policy that covered hospitalization for all accidents and diseases, they were willing to pay a higher premium for the second policy, because the added detail gave them a more vivid picture of the circumstances in which it might be needed. In 1982, an experiment was done with professional forecasters and planners. One group was asked to assess the probability of “a complete suspension of diplomatic relations between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, sometime in 1983,” and another group was asked to assess the probability of “a Russian invasion of Poland, and a complete suspension of diplomatic relations between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, sometime in 1983.” The experts judged the second scenario more likely than the first, even though it required two separate events to occur. They were seduced by the detail. It was no news to Tetlock, therefore, that experts got beaten by formulas. But he does believe that he discovered something about why some people make better forecasters than other people. It has to do not with what the experts believe but with the way they think. Tetlock uses Isaiah Berlin’s metaphor from Archilochus, from his essay on Tolstoy, “The Hedgehog and the Fox,” to illustrate the difference. He says: Low scorers look like hedgehogs: thinkers who “know one big thing,” aggressively extend the explanatory reach of that one big thing into new domains, display bristly impatience with those who “do not get it,” and express considerable confidence that they are already pretty proficient forecasters, at least in the long term. High scorers look like foxes: thinkers who know many small things (tricks of their trade), are skeptical of grand schemes, see explanation and prediction not as deductive exercises but rather as exercises in flexible “ad hocery” that require stitching together diverse sources of information, and are rather diffident about their own forecasting prowess. A hedgehog is a person who sees international affairs to be ultimately determined by a single bottom-line force: balance-of-power considerations, or the clash of civilizations, or globalization and the spread of free markets. A hedgehog is the kind of person who holds a great-man theory of history, according to which the Cold War does not end if there is no Ronald Reagan. Or he or she might adhere to the “actor-dispensability thesis,” according to which Soviet Communism was doomed no matter what. Whatever it is, the big idea, and that idea alone, dictates the probable outcome of events. For the hedgehog, therefore, predictions that fail are only “off on timing,” or are “almost right,” derailed by an unforeseeable accident. There are always little swerves in the short run, but the long run irons them out. Foxes, on the other hand, don’t see a single determining explanation in history. They tend, Tetlock says, “to see the world as a shifting mixture of self-fulfilling and self-negating prophecies: self-fulfilling ones in which success breeds success, and failure, failure but only up to a point, and then self-negating prophecies kick in as people recognize that things have gone too far.”

### 1NC---OFF

#### The 1AC is premised upon Cartesian-Newtonian metaphysics---that locks in static ontologies that obscure the dynamic nature of reality.

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Transgressing the Boundaries: Towards a Liberatory Science

Over the past two decades there has been extensive discussion among critical theorists with regard to the characteristics of modernist versus postmodernist culture; and in recent years these dialogues have begun to devote detailed attention to the specific problems posed by the natural sciences.75 In particular, Madsen and Madsen have recently given a very clear summary of the characteristics of modernist versus postmodernist science. They posit two criteria for a postmodern science:

A simple criterion for science to qualify as postmodern is that it be free from any dependence on the concept of objective truth. By this criterion, for example, the complementarity interpretation of quantum physics due to Niels Bohr and the Copenhagen school is seen as postmodernist.76

Clearly, quantum gravity is in this respect an archetypal postmodernist science. Secondly,

The other concept which can be taken as being fundamental to postmodern science is that of essentiality. Postmodern scientific theories are constructed from those theoretical elements which are essential for the consistency and utility of the theory.77

Thus, quantities or objects which are in principle unobservable -- such as space-time points, exact particle positions, or quarks and gluons -- ought not to be introduced into the theory.78 While much of modern physics is excluded by this criterion, quantum gravity again qualifies: in the passage from classical general relativity to the quantized theory, space-time points (and indeed the space-time manifold itself) have disappeared from the theory.

However, these criteria, admirable as they are, are insufficient for a liberatory postmodern science: they liberate human beings from the tyranny of ``absolute truth'' and ``objective reality'', but not necessarily from the tyranny of other human beings. In Andrew Ross' words, we need a science ``that will be publicly answerable and of some service to progressive interests.''79 From a feminist standpoint, Kelly Oliver makes a similar argument:

... in order to be revolutionary, feminist theory cannot claim to describe what exists, or, ``natural facts.'' Rather, feminist theories should be political tools, strategies for overcoming oppression in specific concrete situations. The goal, then, of feminist theory, should be to develop strategic theories -- not true theories, not false theories, but strategic theories.80

How, then, is this to be done?

In what follows, I would like to discuss the outlines of a liberatory postmodern science on two levels: first, with regard to general themes and attitudes; and second, with regard to political goals and strategies.

One characteristic of the emerging postmodern science is its stress on nonlinearity and discontinuity: this is evident, for example, in chaos theory and the theory of phase transitions as well as in quantum gravity.81 At the same time, feminist thinkers have pointed out the need for an adequate analysis of fluidity, in particular turbulent fluidity.82 These two themes are not as contradictory as it might at first appear: turbulence connects with strong nonlinearity, and smoothness/fluidity is sometimes associated with discontinuity (e.g. in catastrophe theory83); so a synthesis is by no means out of the question.

Secondly, the postmodern sciences deconstruct and transcend the Cartesian metaphysical distinctions between humankind and Nature, observer and observed, Subject and Object. Already quantum mechanics, earlier in this century, shattered the ingenuous Newtonian faith in an objective, pre-linguistic world of material objects ``out there''; no longer could we ask, as Heisenberg put it, whether ``particles exist in space and time objectively''. But Heisenberg's formulation still presupposes the objective existence of space and time as the neutral, unproblematic arena in which quantized particle-waves interact (albeit indeterministically); and it is precisely this would-be arena that quantum gravity problematizes. Just as quantum mechanics informs us that the position and momentum of a particle are brought into being only by the act of observation, so quantum gravity informs us that space and time themselves are contextual, their meaning defined only relative to the mode of observation.84

Thirdly, the postmodern sciences overthrow the static ontological categories and hierarchies characteristic of modernist science. In place of atomism and reductionism, the new sciences stress the dynamic web of relationships between the whole and the part; in place of fixed individual essences (e.g. Newtonian particles), they conceptualize interactions and flows (e.g. quantum fields). Intriguingly, these homologous features arise in numerous seemingly disparate areas of science, from quantum gravity to chaos theory to the biophysics of self-organizing systems. In this way, the postmodern sciences appear to be converging on a new epistemological paradigm, one that may be termed an ecological perspective, broadly understood as ``recogniz[ing] the fundamental interdependence of all phenomena and the embeddedness of individuals and societies in the cyclical patterns of nature.''85

A fourth aspect of postmodern science is its self-conscious stress on symbolism and representation. As Robert Markley points out, the postmodern sciences are increasingly transgressing disciplinary boundaries, taking on characteristics that had heretofore been the province of the humanities:

Quantum physics, hadron bootstrap theory, complex number theory, and chaos theory share the basic assumption that reality cannot be described in linear terms, that nonlinear -- and unsolvable -- equations are the only means possible to describe a complex, chaotic, and non-deterministic reality. These postmodern theories are -- significantly -- all metacritical in the sense that they foreground themselves as metaphors rather than as ``accurate'' descriptions of reality. In terms that are more familiar to literary theorists than to theoretical physicists, we might say that these attempts by scientists to develop new strategies of description represent notes towards a theory of theories, of how representation -- mathematical, experimental, and verbal -- is inherently complex and problematizing, not a solution but part of the semiotics of investigating the universe.86 87

From a different starting point, Aronowitz likewise suggests that a liberatory science may arise from interdisciplinary sharing of epistemologies:

... natural objects are also socially constructed. It is not a question of whether these natural objects, or, to be more precise, the objects of natural scientific knowledge, exist independently of the act of knowing. This question is answered by the assumption of ``real'' time as opposed to the presupposition, common among neo-Kantians, that time always has a referent, that temporality is therefore a relative, not an unconditioned, category. Surely, the earth evolved long before life on earth. The question is whether objects of natural scientific knowledge are constituted outside the social field. If this is possible, we can assume that science or art may develop procedures that effectively neutralize the effects emanating from the means by which we produce knowledge/art. Performance art may be such an attempt.88

Finally, postmodern science provides a powerful refutation of the authoritarianism and elitism inherent in traditional science, as well as an empirical basis for a democratic approach to scientific work. For, as Bohr noted, ``a complete elucidation of one and the same object may require diverse points of view which defy a unique description'' -- this is quite simply a fact about the world, much as the self-proclaimed empiricists of modernist science might prefer to deny it. In such a situation, how can a self-perpetuating secular priesthood of credentialed ``scientists'' purport to maintain a monopoly on the production of scientific knowledge? (Let me emphasize that I am in no way opposed to specialized scientific training; I object only when an elite caste seeks to impose its canon of ``high science'', with the aim of excluding a priori alternative forms of scientific production by non-members.89)

#### Nothing is wholly obvious without becoming enigmatic. Reality itself it too obvious to be true.

Baudrillard ’10 (Jean, Carnival and Cannibal; Ventriloquous Evil, p. 70-73) [m leap]

IN THE PROMETHEAN PERSPECTIVE of unlimited growth, there is not merely the desire to make everything function, to liberate everything, but also the desire to make everything signify. Everything is to be brought under the aegis of meaning (and reality). In some cases we know that knowledge will forever escape us. But in the immense majority of cases we do not even know what has disappeared and has always already eluded us. Now, science makes a systematic effort to eradicate this secret area, this 'constellation of the mystery"' and to eliminate this demarcation line between the violable and the inviolable. All that is concealed must be revealed; everything must be reducible to analysis. Hence the whole effort (particularly since the death of God, who restrained this attempt to break open the natural world) leads to an extension of the field of meaning (of knowledge, analysis, objectivity and reality). Now, everything inclines us to think that this accumulation, this over-production, this proliferation of meaning constitutes (a little like the accumulation of greenhouse gases) a virtual threat for the species (and for the planet), since it is gradually destroying, through experimentation, that domain of the inviolable that serves us, as it were, as an ozone layer and protects us from the worst—from the lethal irradiation and obliteration of our symbolic space. Shouldn't we then, work precisely in the opposite direction, to extend the domain of the inviolable? To restrain the production of meaning the way they are trying to restrain the production of greenhouse gases, to reinforce that constellation of the mystery and that intangible barrier that serves as a screen against the welter of information, interaction and universal exchange. This countervailing work exists—it is the work of thought. Not the analytic work of an understanding of causes, of the dissection of an object-world, not the work of a critical, en-lightened thought, but another form of understanding or intelligence, which is the intelligence of the mystery.

#### There is a killer in every person---holier-than-thou moralizations against warfare and irrrationality is the very basis for genocidal cruelty.

**Bataille 86.** Georges, insane librarian, Erotism: Death & Sensuality. 72-80

Duels, feuds and war We may find the desire to eat human flesh completely alien to us; not so the desire to kill. Not all of us feel it, but who would go so far as to deny that it has as lively, if not as exacting, an existence among the masses as sexual appetite? There is a potential killer in every man; the frequency of senseless massacres throughout history makes that much plain. The desire to kill relates to the taboo on murder in just the same way as does the desire for sexual activity to the complex of prohibitions limiting it. Sexual activity is only forbidden in certain cases, but then so is murder; it may be more roundly and more generally forbidden than sexual activity is, but the taboo, like that on sex, only serves to limit killing to certain specific situations. The formula has a massive simplicity: "Thou shalt not kill." Universal, yes, but obvious exceptions are implied-" except in wartime, and other circumstances allowed, more or less, by the body politic." So there is a nearly perfect analogy between it and the sexual commandment which runs: "Thou shalt not perfonn the carnal act except in matrimony alone." To this should obviously be added "or in certain cases hallowed by custom". A man may kill another in ~ duel, in a feud, and in war. Murder is criminal. Murder implies that the taboo is either not known or not heeded. Duels, feuds and war do violate an accepted taboo, but according to set rules. In the duel of today with its complicated procedure the sense of something forbidden is dominant. Not so with primitive peoples; with them the taboo could only be violated with a religious intent, and duels cannot have been the confrontation of mere individuals as they were from the Middle Ages onwards. In the first place the duel was a form of war; the two sides pinned their faith on the valour of their champions who met in single combat after a challenge duly given and received, fighting it out in front of the masses intent on mutual destruction. Feuds are a kind of war where the antagonists belong to a tribe rather than to a territory. Like duels, like war, they are ordered with detailed precision.

The hunt and the expiation of the animal's death In feuds and duels, and in war, which we shall consider later, it is a man's death that occurs, although the law forbidding killing is earlier than the distinction felt by man between himself and the larger animals. Indeed, this distinction comes quite late. To begin with man saw himself as like the animals, and this attitude persists to this day in hunting peoples with their primitive customs. Hence the hunting of primitive man is, no less than duels, feuds and war, a fOf!Il of transgression. Yet there is one significant difference. It seems that murder of a fellow man was unknown in the very earliest times when humanity was closest to the animals. 1 There is no taboo as such on the killing by one animal of another like itself, but in fact such killings are rare in instinctive animal behaviour, whatever difficulties instinct may raise. Even fights between animals of the same species do not necessarily end in a kill. On the other hand, in those days it must have been usual to hunt other animals. We could maintain that hunting is the outcome of work, made possible only by the fabrication of stone tools and weapons. But even if the taboo were generally a consequence of work, it could not have come into being so swiftly as to rule out a long period during which hunting developed and no taboo on killing animals surrounded it. Anyway we cannot imagine a period dominated by the taboo and then a return to hunting after a deliberate 74 MURDER, HUNTING AND WAR act of transgression. The taboo on hunting offers the same characteristics as other taboos. I have stressed the fact that broadly speaking there is a taboo on sexual activity, but this can only be readily grasped through a comparison with the taboo on hunting among hunting peoples. Men do not necessarily abstain from the forbidden activity, but take part in it as a conscious infringement of the law. Neither hunting nor sexual activity could be forbidden in practice. The taboo cannot suppress pursuits necessary to life, but it can give them the significance of a religious violation. It imposes limits on them and controls the form that they take. It can exact penance from the guilty. The act of killing invested the killer, hunter or warrior, with a sacramental character. In order to take their place once more in profane society they had to be cleansed and purified, and this was the object of expiatory rituals. Primitive societies give numerous examples of these. Prehistorians usually ascribe a magical significance to cave paintings. The hunters were after these animals, and they were depicted in the hope that pictorial expression of the wish would make the wish come true. I am not so sure that this was so. Might not the secret and religious atmosphere of the caves have corresponded with the religious nature of transgression which indisputably invested the hunt with significance? Representation would then have followed on transgression. This would be difficult to prove, but if prehistorians were to visualise the alternation of taboo and transgression and perceive clearly the religious aura that surrounded the animals as they were done to death, I think we might adopt a standpoint in greater harmony with the importance of religion in the earliest development of humanity in preference to the magical image theory which has something poor and unsatisfying about it. The cave drawings must have" been intended to depict that instant when the animal appeared and killing, at once inevitable and reprehensible, laid bare life's mysterious ambiguity. Tormented man refuses life, yet lives it out as he miraculously transcends his own refusal. This hypothesis rests on the fact that expiation regularly follows upon the killing of an animal among peoples whose way of life is probably similar to that of the cave artists. Its great merit is to suggest a coherent interpretation of the Lascaux pit painting where a dying bison faces the man who has probably killed it and whom the painter shows as a dead man. The subject of this famous picture, which has called forth numerous contradictory and unsatisfactory explanations, would therefore be murder and expiation.! This view has at least the virtue of replacing the magical (and utilitarian) interpretation of cave pictures with its obvious insufficiency by a religious one more in keeping with notions of the ultimate in human experience that are usually the concern of art and are here echoed by these prodigious paintings come down to us from the depths of the past. The earliest record of war Hunting must be considered as a primitive form of transgression apparently earlier than war which seems to have been unknown to the men of the "Franco-cantabrian" painted caves living during the Upper Paleolithic period. At any rate war would not have had the primary importance it attained l~ter for these our earliest fellow men; indeed they put us in mind of the Eskimos who up to our own day have lived mostly ignorant of war. War was first depicted by the men of the rock paintings of eastern Spain. Their pictures seem to date partly from the end of the Upper Paleolithic, partly from the succeeding period. Towards the end of the Upper Paleolithic ten or fifteen thousand years ago, the transgression of the taboo forbidding originally the killing of animals, considered as essentially the same as man, and then the killing of man himself, became formalised in war. Just like the taboos surrounding death, the transgression of these taboos has left far reaching signs, as we shall see. I have remarked earlier that any certain knowledge of sexual taboos and transgressions dates only from historical times. There are several reasons in a work on eroticism for tackling first transgression in general and that of the taboo on murder in particular. It would be impossible to grasp the significance of eroticism without reference to the general pattern; eroticism is disconcerting and difficult to comprehend if its contradictory effects have not first been seen more clearly and earlier in time in another domain. All that the Spanish Levant paintings show is how long ago two groups of adversaries first met in war. But archaeological evidence on war is in general abundant. The struggle between two groups demands in itself a few essential rules. The first obviously concerns the marking off of hostile groups and a declaration of hostilities before the combat. We have definite knowledge of the rules for a declaration of war among primitive peoples. The aggressors' own private decision might suffice, and then the adversary was taken by surprise. But it seemed more frequently within the spirit of the transgression to give him a ritual warning. The war that followed might itself develop according to rules. Primitive war is rather like a holiday, a feast day, and even modern war almost always has some of this paradoxical similarity. The taste for showy and magnificent war dress goes very far back, for originally war seemed a luxury. It was no attempt to increase the peoples' or rulers' riches by conquest: it was an aggressive and extravagant exuberance. The distinction between ritual and calculated forms of war Military uniforms have carried on this tradition right up to modem times; the preponderant consideration now, however, is to avoid attracting the" enemy's fire. But this concern to minimise losses is foreign to the earliest spirit of war. Transgressing the taboo was first and foremost an end in itself, though secondarily it may have served some other purpose. There are grounds for believing that war was first another outlet for the feelings that are given expression in ceremonial rites. The evolution of war in feudal China, long before our own date, is described thus: "A baron's war began with a challenge. Warriors sent by their lord would come and die heroically by their own hand before the rival lord, or else a war chariot would hurl itself insultingly towards the adversaries' city gates. Then the chariots engage in a melee and the lords make conventional charges at each other before the fight to the death begins in earnest."l The archaic aspects of the Homeric wars have a universal character. It was really a game, but the results were so serious that very soon calculated action superseded obedience to the rules of the game. The history of China makes this plain: " ... as time goes on, these chivalrous customs lapse. What was once a war of chivalry degenerates into a pitiless struggle, into a clash of peoples and the entire population of a province would be hurled against its neighbours." War has in fact always oscillated between giving primary importance to adherence to the rules when war is an end in itself and setting a premium on the hoped for political result. Even in our own day there are two opposite schools of thought among military specialists. Clausewitz took his stand against exponents of the tradition of chivalry and emphasised the need to destroy the enemy's forces without pity. "War," he writes "is an act of violence, and there is no limit to the manifestation of this violence. ''2 There is no doubt that broadly speaking his tendency has slowly come to the fore in the modem world, superseding the ritual practices of the past with their hold on the older generation. We must be careful not to confuse the humanisation of war and its fundamental tradition. Up to a certain point the necessities of war have left room for the development of individual rites. The spirit of traditional rules may have favoured this developlnent but the rules themselves never correspond with our contemporary concern to limit losses or the suffering of combatants. Limits were set to the breaking of the taboo, but they were formal ones. The aggressive impulse did not hold undisputed sway. Conditions were laid down, rules were meticulously observed, but once the frenzy was loosed it knew no bounds. Cruelty and organised war War was different in kind from animal violence and it developed a cruelty animals are incapable of, especially in that the fight, frequently followed by a massacre of the enemy, was as often as not a prelude to the torture of the prisoners. This cruelty is the specifically human aspect of war. I take the following frightful details from Maurice Davie: "In Africa, war captives are often tortured, killed, or allowed to starve to death. Among the Tshi-speaking peoples 'prisoners of war are treated with shocking barbarity.' Men, women and children-mothers with infants on their backs and little children scarcely able to walk-are stripped and secured together with cords round the neck in gangs of ten or fifteen; each prisoner being additionally secured by having the hands fixed to a heavy block of wood, which has to be carried on the head. Thus hampered, and so insufficiently fed that they are reduced to mere skeletons, they are driven after the victorious army for month after month, their brutal guards treating them with the greatest cruelty; while, should their captors suffer a reverse, they are at once indiscriminately slaughtered to prevent recapture. Ramseyer and Kuhne mention the case of a prisoner, a native of Accra, who was 'kept in log', that is, secured to the felled trunk of a tree by an iron staple driven over the wrist, with insufficient food for four months, and who died under this ill-treatment. Another time they saw amongst some prisoners a poor, weak child, who, when angrily ordered to stand upright, 'painfully drew himself upright showing the sunken frame in which every bone was visible.' MURDER, HUNTING AND WAR 79 Most of the prisoners seen on this occasion were mere Ii ving skeletons. One boy was so reduced by starvation, that his neck was unable to support the weight of his head, which, if he sat, drooped almost to his knees. Another equally emaciated, coughed as if at the last gasp; while a young child was so weak from want of food as to be unable to stand. The ashantis were much surprised that the missionaries should exhibit any emotion at such spectacles; and, on one occasion when they went to give food to some starving children, the guards angrily drove them back." Both the regular army and the levies in Dahomey show an equal callousness to human suffering. "Wounded prisoners are denied all assistance, and all prisoners who are not destined to" slavery are kept in a condition of semi-starvation that speedily reduces . them to mere skeletons . . . The lower jaw bone is much prized as a trophy ... and it is very frequently torn from the wounded and living foe" .... The scenes that followed the sack of a fortress in Fiji "are too horrible to be described in detail." That neither age nor sex were spared was the least atrocious feature. Nameless mutilations inflicted sometimes on living victims, deeds of mingled cruelty and lust, made sclf-destruction preferable to capture. With the fatalism that underlies the Melanesian character many would not attempt to run away, but would bow their heads passively to the club stroke. If any were miserable- enough to be taken alive their fate was awful indeed. Carried back bound to the main village, they were given up to young boys of rank to practice their ingenuity in torture, or stunned by a blow they were laid in heated ovens, and when the heat brought them back to consciousness of pain, their frantic struggles would convulse the spectators with laughter."} Violence, not cruel in itself, is essentially something organised in the transgression of taboos. Cruelty is one of its forms; it is not necessarily erotic but it may veer towards other forms of violence organised by transgression. Eroticism, like cruelty, is premeditated. Cruelty and eroticism are conscious intentions in a mind which has resolved to trespass into a forbidden field of behaviour. Such a determination is not a general one, but it is always possible to pass from one domain to another, for these contiguous domains are both founded on the heady exhilaration of making a determined escape from the power of a taboo. The resolve is .all the more powerful because the return to stability afterwards is at the back of the mind, and without that the outward surge could not take place. It is as if the waters should overflow and yet be certain to subside again at the same time. The transition from one state to another may be made as long as the basic framework is not risked. Cruelty may veer towards eroticism, and similarly a massacre of prisoners may possibly end in cannibalism. But a return to animality where all limits are removed is inconceivable in war. There are always some reserves made which stress the human character of even unbridled violence. Athirst for blood, the warriors still do not tum on each other in their frenzy. Here is an intangible rule which regulates fury at its roots. Similarly the taboo on cannibalism generally persists even when the most inhuman passions are raging. We must point out that the most sinister forms are not necessarily linked with primitive savagery. Organised war with its efficient military operations based on discipline, which when all is said and done excludes the mass of the combatants from the pleasure of transgressing the limits, has been caught up in a mechanism foreign to the impulsions which set it off in the first place; war today has only the remotest connection with war as I have described it; it is a dismal aberration geared to political ends. Primitive war itself can hardly be defended: from the outset it bore the seeds of modern warfare, but the organised form we are familiar with today, that has travelled such a long way from the original organised transgression of the taboo, is the only one that would leave humanity unsatisfied} I If its machinery were to be set going, that is.

#### To make the world mean something, the will to reality, is the generative point of violence. The attempt to sublimate the Evil of irrationality and mystery terminates in its opposite. The amassing of facts and evidence---and especially truth---only makes the world more unreal.

Artrip and Debrix 14 [Ryan Artrip, doctoral candidate in ASPECT at Virginia Tech, and François Debrix, Director of ASPECT and Professor of Political Science at Virginia Tech, “The Digital Fog of War: Baudrillard and the Violence of Representation” <http://www2.ubishops.ca/baudrillardstudies/vol-11_2/v11-2-debrix.html>]

It is in this always operative tendency of rendered appearances to yield meaning (even if their meaning is to be information-worthy), not in the image or event itself, that we situate the conditions of possibility and reproducibility for the ever-thickening representational fog and for the violence/virulence of images, or better yet, of appearances. To make war or, as the case may be, the terror event mean something—even in some of the most immediate reactions often designed to evoke injustice or, indeed, incomprehension—is the generative point of violence, the source of representation as a virulent/virtual code and mode of signification. Baudrillard writes, “Everywhere one seeks to produce meaning, to make the world signify, to render it visible.” He adds, “We are not, however, in danger of lacking meaning; […] we are gorged with meaning and it is killing us” (Baudrillard, 1988: 63). Indeed, the Western world—increasingly, the global—has found itself with a proliferation of meanings and significations in the late 20th and early 21st centuries. It is as if the so-called crisis of nihilism (thought to be characteristic of much critique and philosophical suspicion throughout the 20th century) later on produced something of the opposite order. The mass violence of the 20th century inaugurated not a complete void of despair or meaninglessness, but instead a flood of meaning, if not an overproduction of it. Baudrillard refers to this frantic explosion of meaning/signification as “a panic-stricken production of the real and the referential, above and parallel to the panic of material production […]” (Baudrillard, 1983: 7). Here, Baudrillard describes a mode of production of a different kind, not motivated by class interests or exploitation of value, but by an automated, perhaps viral, abreaction to the empty core or disenchantment of things and the world: that is to say, the degree to which things seem to lack a singular center of gravity or have lost a justifiable reference to the real world, and yet each thing that “matters” is also an attempt to get at reality as a question of accumulation (of meaning), circulation (of signs), and filling up of all interstitial spaces of communication and value. The end result is an over-abundance of signs and images of reality, something that culminates in what Baudrillard calls hyperreality—things appear more real than reality itself. The story that needs to be told is thus not about the undoubtedly deplorable “truth” or fact of explosive and warlike violence, but about a violence of another sort. In the radical digital transparency of the global scene, we (members of the demos) often have full or direct exposure to explosivity, as we saw above with the image of terror. But what still needs to be thought and problematized is implosivity or what may be called implosive violence. Implosive violence is a violence for which we do not, and perhaps will never, have much of a language (Rancière, 2007: 123). Although, not having a language for it or, rather, as we saw above, seeking to find a language to talk about it and, perhaps, to make sense of it is still sought after. This is, perhaps, what digital pictures of war/terror violence seek to capture or want to force through. Implosive violence, often digitally rendered these days, is in close contact with media technologies and representational devices and techniques because it seeks representation and meaning. This is why implosive violence insists on calling in wars (against terror, for example) and on mobilizing war machines (against terrorist others, against vague enemy figures), but wars and war machines that no longer have—to the extent that they ever had—a clearly identifiable object and subject, or a clear mission/purpose. As such, this implosive violence and its wars (the new Western/global way of war, perhaps) must remain uncertain, unclear, foggy, inwardly driven, representational, and indeed virulent. They must remain uncertain and confused even as they are digitally operative and desperately capture events/images to give the impression that meanings/significations can and will be found. Yet, as we saw above, it is not meanings exactly that must be found, but information and the endless guarantee of its immediate circulation. As information occupies the empty place of meaning, certainty, or truth, images must be instantaneously turned into appearances that search for meanings that will never be discovered because, instead, a proliferation of information-worthy facts and beliefs will take over (perhaps this is what US fake pundit and comedian Stephen Colbert famously referred to as “truthiness”). Or, as Baudrillard puts it, “free from its former enemies, humanity now has to create enemies from within, which in fact produces a wide variety of inhuman metastases” (Baudrillard, 2003). Thus, this implosive violence is destined to be a global violence since it "is the product of a system that tracks down any form of negativity and singularity, including of course death as the ultimate form of singularity. […] It is a violence that, in a sense, puts an end to violence itself and strives to establish a world where anything related to the natural must disappear […] Better than a global violence, we should call it a global virulence. This form of violence is indeed viral. It moves by contagion, produces by chain reaction, and little by little it destroys our immune systems and our capacities to resist" (2003; our italics). In a way, this global virulence is all-out and everyday war itself. It is also the Global War on Terror, a war whose virulence and ever present (virtual, potential) violence mediatizes and hyper-realizes everyday life for a lot of human bodies in the West and beyond (is that not also something that the Boston Marathon bombing smart phone representations struggled to tell us?). For Baudrillard, this is how we should apprehend the mythos of globalization (since globalization is all about virulence).

#### The propagation of hierarchical social logics makes their impacts a self fulfilling prophecy and drives inescapable cycles of structural violence.

Robinson 10 (Andrew; political theorist and activist based in the UK, *In Theory: Anarchism, war and the state*, https://ceasefiremagazine.co.uk/anarchism-war-and-the-state/)

In response to a common misconception, it is not true that anarchists oppose the state because they are naïve about human nature. Anarchist views about human nature are widely variant. Objections to the state can be convincing based on many different views, such as distrusting people to hold too much power without abusing it. Statists might be said to have a dual conception of human nature: the good people are trusted with excessive power so as to disempower the bad people. Statism is thus associated with hierarchical differentiations of people. Further, the objection is not simply to states as institutions but to state-like ways of relating and acting: in some accounts, the state is a social relation. In anarchist theory, states are viewed as expressions of hierarchical, oppressive social logics. They are forces of decomposition, which tend to attack or break down alternative, horizontal social relations. They are also based on ‘reactive’ emotional forces of suspicion, hatred and aggression which they channel to produce warlike relations among people. They also turn on one another, accumulating wealth by pillaging other states or societies. Against such state violence, anarchist strategies often seek to find or form focal-points for social power which can counterbalance or draw energies away from state power. These focal-points necessarily involve living and acting in non-militarist, non-authoritarian ways. In Statism and Anarchy, Bakunin portrays the modern state as primarily military, and closely connected to the ruling class. As a military force, the state is necessarily aggressive, competing with other states for power. It produces moral and intellectual decay through its corrupting power. The extent of this decay depends on the extent to which the state’s way of thinking filters down through society, a process which is strongest in the most militaristic states. The ‘people’, primarily meaning the excluded and powerless, are for Bakunin a potential counterpoint to the state, and can destroy it in insurrection. Kropotkin similarly argues that the state, or ‘political principle’ (vertical association or hierarchy), is counterposed to society, or the ‘social principle’ (horizontal association or affinity). In The State: Its Historic Role, he argues that the state is ‘synonymous with war’. The state brings peace, if at all, only as lifeless dominance in a ‘colourless, lifeless whole’. Social networks bring effervescent life, whereas states bring death through structural violence and pillage. Since the state cannot tolerate other sources of power, it wages constant war against social networks as they arise. There is thus a constant zero-sum struggle between the state as a force of control and impoverishment and social networks as spaces for freedom and creativity. Local communities have capabilities for self-defence and/or peacebuilding. Although wars can be fought outside or against states, they have a different significance, enlivening people in the defence of liberty rather than disempowering them through its destruction. Stirner’s argument is rather different. In The Ego and its Own, he starts from a critique of social roles and categories, termed ‘spooks’ in his work, to derive a critique of submission to overarching categories of all kinds. Stirner is what would today be called an ‘anti-essentialist’, an opponent of fixed labels and of the privileging of some aspects of a person over others. States are rejected as bearers of particular categories which are wrongly accorded a greater status than other categories. Further, sacrifices for the state are always matters of the state’s self-interest. By claiming a monopoly on violence, the state pursues self-interested violence at the expense of its subjects. Tolstoy’s Christian Anarcho-Pacifism draws similar distinctions, but characterises the anti-state pole rather differently. For Tolstoy, the state’s ‘law of violence’ stands against a ‘law of love’, with each expressing a particular emotional climate and set of passions. States embody ‘low passions’ such as hatred (often channelled against outsiders using nationalism), against which love provides a basis for peace and happiness. Love is expressed in acts such as conscientious objection, withdrawing the social activity on which state violence is based. Anarchists Emma Goldman and Alexander Berkman were central in anti-conscription activism in First World War America and were jailed as prisoners of conscience. Their anti-militarist critiques placed a strong emphasis on socialist criticisms of the capitalistic basis of war. Elites use irrational prejudices to manipulate people into fighting on their behalf. Rudolf Rocker wrote an influential anarchist critique of nationalism around the same time, portraying the state as distorting legitimate particularisms into hateful chauvinisms. Also in this period, Randolph Bourne popularised the phrase ‘war is the health of the state’. In an unfinished work titled The State, he argued that the state demands ‘mystic[al] devotion’, which war is a means to realise. In war, the permanent state machine displaces party competition and comes to monopolise public life. Its main aim is not victory, but the ‘spiritual compulsion’ bound up with the ideal of the state, with the triumph of a ‘herd’ mentality over creativity and difference. The outpouring of irrational, reactive forces is managed by nationalistic elites for their own benefit. With fascism overrunning Europe, the leftist psychoanalyst Wilhelm Reich pioneered a sexual-liberationist critique of militaristic states in his Mass Psychology of Fascism. Reich views repressive social systems as enabled by repressive biological and emotional structures through which people prevent themselves from feeling emotions. Fascism emerges from a complete identification with state power and the leader, a pattern derived from identification with the father in patriarchal, authoritarian families. Such families train people to channel attachments vertically rather than horizontally. More recently, Klaus Theweleit used this approach to interpret the masculine violence of proto-fascist groups as an attempt to seek existential security in categories of purity and displays of superiority over demonised others. On a similar line of thought, authors from the Frankfurt School have argued that industrialised war and genocide throw doubt on the benevolence of modernity. Adorno links war to the desire to dominate nature. Fromm argues that humanity’s survival is put at risk by a peculiarly human type of malevolent aggression arising from alienation. Marcuse critiques the discourse of war as a kind of doublespeak, and interprets modern war as a self-frustrating product of the frustration-aggression complex. Frustration arising from capitalist life is channelled and rendered socially functional through military aggression, but cannot be alleviated by such aggression because human means of war have been replaced with technological means. War thus tends towards repetition and escalation. Walter Benjamin’s ‘Critique of Violence’ distinguishes between three types of violence or effective action. States are founded in law-making violence which posits their own command as the law, are maintained by law-preserving violence which maintains a status-quo through small acts of enforcement, and can be shattered by law-destroying violence (such as a general strike). For Benjamin, the state is based on reactive attachments, here interpreted as power over life for the sake of power, and is fearful, becoming more authoritarian over time as it becomes afraid of the emergence of counter-powers. Law-making violence is instrumental, whereas law-destroying violence is expressive, directing itself against the capability to use law-making or preserving violence. The theory of the state as a source of social decomposition by means of social war is extended by Antonio Negri in his 1970s-era works. Negri views state violence as a means to preserve capitalist domination as a kind of irrational social command over labour. The new form of the state, the ‘crisis-state’, is geared to a permanent state of exception which simultaneously causes and wards off extreme risks of destruction such as nuclear war. It also forms an internal warfare state directed at forces of life, autonomous social movements, with which it is in an irreducible antagonism. In this phase, Negri views such movements as tending to become an armed society counterposed to the state. This view of radical antagonism fades in Negri’s more recent work, but still in Hardt and Negri’s Empire and Multitude, the state is deemed to be waging an unwinnable, unlimited global war indistinguishable from policing. Also from an autonomist standpoint, the Midnight Notes Collective have argued that recent wars are means for preserving Northern monopolies on advanced technologies by playing on risks of weapons proliferation, or are resource wars focused on the enclosure and exploitation of resources. The idea of the ‘state of exception’ has been expanded by Giorgio Agamben. Looking at autonomy more broadly, alternatives to the state also emerge in studies of stateless indigenous social groups. There is substantial debate on whether such groups are warlike, with scholars arguing that certain groups are extremely peaceful or engage only in ritualised forms of combat. Clastres’ theory of indigenous warfare stands out in showing the difference between indigenous and statist types of war. In his theory, indigenous war is a way of asserting the difference and autonomy of each village or band, placing an obstacle in the way of state-formation by ensuring that power remains diffuse. Statist war, in contrast, causes ethnocide, which is inscribed in the nature of the state as the dissolution of the many into the one. Autonomous social movements such as La Ruta Pacifica also offer autonomous responses to war. In this group’s discourse, social weaving is theorised as a way of counterposing energies of hope to those which sustain the permanent state of war in Colombia. Their activities focus on morale-boosting, emotional repair, collective mourning and working through fear. They believe that violence decomposes social relations, so that power can be exercised by recomposing relations. Noam Chomsky is perhaps the best-known anarchist critic of imperialist wars. Chomsky’s work focuses on exposing the lies and distortions of political and media accounts of wars, focusing on the empirical rebuttal of false claims. Chomsky focused on economic self-interest as the main motive for warmongering, portraying the military-industrial complex as a financial racket. As well as direct resource grabs, the American war-machine is directed at making the current world-system seem inescapable by eliminating ‘the threat of a good example’, of a country which succeeds without playing America’s game. To allow such warmongering, illusions are systematically manufactured through distorted media coverage. Such ideologies can also be self-perpetuating, particularly among the foreign policy ‘backroom boys’, causing wars through their own dynamic even where there is little economic or geostrategic benefit. The insurrectionist anarchist Alfredo Bonanno provides another contemporary theory of anarchism and war. In Bonanno’s theory, affirmation of life goes hand-in-hand with assaults on structures of power and alienation. Insurrection is viewed as the point of explosion of accumulated discontent. Struggle must not, however, reproduce militarist approaches which are ‘the dominion of death’. Bonanno also interprets ethno-religious civil wars in terms of the mistaken mapping of the desire for revolt onto misleading ethno-religious categories. Nationalist wars can be manufactured to defuse the ‘powder-keg’ of revolt, or can complicate rebellions against the powerful. In poststructuralism, war is critiqued as part of a mechanism of logistical control through which diffuse hierarchical apparatuses reshape society. Deleuze and Guattari view states as counterposed to autonomous war-machines of the kind discussed by Clastres. The state also captures such war-machines, turning them into forces of reactive desire for its own projects of ‘antiproduction’ or decomposition. War-machines captured by states become agencies of “war for war’s sake”, tending towards total destruction. Virilio treats the military class as an important social force with its own logic or ‘essence’ which it seeks to impose on society. The method of the military class is not simply to defeat enemies but to control and rearrange space so as to disempower enemies in advance or corrode their affirmative energies. This is achieved, for instance, by creating ecologically inhospitable spaces subject to control, in place of dense ecosystems. The military is thus counterposed to popular defence, which has a different logic based on dense ecosystemic spaces giving strategic advantages over attackers. Today, popular defence has recomposed as insurrection, in cases such as Vietnam and Palestine, and has as its goal the destruction of military control over space. Baudrillard argues that states cause not ‘war’ (which implies an adversarial and symbolic element) but ‘non-war’, a kind of destructive violence in which the enemy is not recognised as an agent but instead, systematically disempowered by technological means. ‘Non-war’ is pursued as a means to systemic dominance, but is compromised by its incapacity for dialogue. One can summarise these various views through a few leitmotifs they have in common. Firstly, anarchist views of war see the state as a force for repressive control, in the interests of the state itself or of a ruling class or elite. Such states find themselves in constant war with other kinds of social forces, and sometimes with other states too. They thus use war as a kind of crisis-management, to control societies and maintain an overall system of control. States are based on, or else produce for their own ends, reactive emotional dispositions of aggression, fear and ‘herd’ morality which find their apex in war. States, especially warfare-states, tend to disempower and sap energies from other social forces and to decompose social relations. Against such powers, people can activate counter-powers, either as forces in a relation of non-militarist war with the state, or as networks which withdraw the everyday power on which the state depends.

#### The alternative is to reject the aff’s moral realist language.

Greene 2 (Joshua David Greene, currently an Assistant Professor of Psychology at Harvard University. “THE TERRIBLE, HORRIBLE, NO GOOD, VERY BAD TRUTH ABOUT MORALITY AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT.” Dissertation presented to Princeton University in candidacy for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. November 2002. <http://www.wjh.harvard.edu/~jgreene/GreeneWJH/Greene-Dissertation.pdf>)

Moral realism is the theoretical expression of the Stone Age moral psychology with which we are saddled. It is an illusion that exacerbates conflict and promotes misunderstanding. If I want things to be one way and you want things to be some other way, we might be able to reach some sort of compromise. But, if I want things to be one way, and if I believe that the way I want things is not merely the way I want things but also the way things ought to be, and if I believe further that it’s just plain to see that my way is the way things ought to be and that anyone who says otherwise must be outright lying or willfully refusing to see the truth, and if you want things to be some other way and you’re just as convinced of the rightness of your position as I am of mine, then what chance do we have of reaching a reasonable compromise? I see you as an errant child, someone who has lost the way, someone who wasn’t paying attention on the day right and wrong were explained, or, perhaps, as someone who was paying attention but who, for whatever inexplicable reason, has chosen to cast aside what is right and good in favor of that which is base and evil. And you, of course, see me in a similar light. I attempt to argue with you and am amazed at your obtuseness. The words I speak so clearly reveal the truth, and yet you persist in your wrongheaded ways. And you are similarly perplexed by me and my stubbornness. Haidt (2001, pg. 823) summarizes the social-intuitionist take on ordinary moral discourse: The bitterness, futility, and self-righteousness of most moral arguments can now be explicated. In a debate on abortion, politics, consensual incest, or on what my friend did to your friend, both sides believe that their positions are based on reasoning about the facts and issues involved (the wag-the-dog illusion). Both sides present what they take to be excellent arguments in support of their positions. Both sides expect the other side to be responsive to such reasons (the wag-the-other-dog’s-tail illusion). When the other side fails to be affected by such good reasons, each side concludes that the other side must be insincere, closed-minded, or even devious…. In this way the culture wars over issues such as homosexuality and abortion can generate morally motivated players on both sides who believe that their opponents are not morally motivated (Haidt & Hersh, 2001, Robinson, Keltner, Ward, & Ross, 1995). A mess, indeed. But how to clean it up? Must we resign ourselves to a world of endless conflict and misunderstanding? Haidt (Pg. 823) suggests a shift in tactics: Moral reasoning may have little persuasive power in conflict situations, but the social intuitionist model says that moral reasoning can be effective in influencing people before a conflict arises… If one can get the other person to see the issue in a new way, perhaps by reframing a problem to trigger new intuitions, then one can influence others with one’s words. This, however, does not get to the heart of the problem. It is a gesture toward more subtle, less explosive forms of moral warfare, not peace. Moreover, it is a lesson that most professional moral communicators have already learned from experience. No surprise that novels, plays, metaphors, and anecdotes are more effective means of propaganda than philosophical arguments and statistics. (I’ve never stayed in a hotel room that came furnished with a copy of Kant’s Grundlegung.) As Haidt suggests, a better understanding of moral psychology may be used to further one’s own moral agenda—a good or bad thing depending on the agenda in question. But I propose instead that we use our understanding of moral psychology to transcend our ordinary modes of moral discourse rather than to operate more effectively within them.15 Once again, the enemy, the wolf in sheep’s clothing, is moral realism. Conflicts of interest may be inevitable, but they need not be exacerbated by people’s unflagging confidence that they’re right and that their opponents are wrong. The solution, then, is to get rid of realist thinking and to start by getting rid of realist language. Speak only in terms that make the subjective nature of value plain. Instead of saying that capital punishment is wrong say that you are opposed to it. Say that it is an ineffective deterrent, difficult to implement in a colorblind fashion, and likely to lead to irreversible mistakes. And then say no more. Instead of saying that eating animals is wrong and a form of murder, say that you are opposed to eating animals because you wish to alleviate suffering and you believe that this practice causes much unnecessary suffering. Instead of saying that gay marriage undermines “family values,” say that it undermines your family’s values, that it is against the teachings of your religion, etc. (Obviously some people will have an easier time with this transition than others. This is an important point to be explored later in Chapter 5.) Speaking in this way is honest, requires no false metaphysical commitments, and should make discussions of moral matters much more fruitful and, at the very least, shorter. When someone makes a claim about how he feels; what he wants, values, or cares about; or what he is or is not willing to accept in a negotiation, there is, in the absence of realist interlocutors, nothing to dispute. When someone makes a putative statement of fact, there is often much to dispute, but in a purely factual discussion there is a decent chance that genuine evidence can be brought to bear on the issue, resolving it in favor of one party or another or, failing that, demonstrating to both parties that the evidence is inconclusive.16 Even where differences of value and/or factual disagreements persist, such a mode of discourse is likely to lead to increased mutual understanding and less exasperating huffing and puffing. The language of moral realism is sufficiently rich to provide a reasonable sounding justification for just about anything a society would actually want to do. Even terrorists (or “freedom fighters,” depending on your point of view) can justify their actions in terms that sound eerily similar to those used by their victims in other contexts. Because there is no fact of the matter about what’s right or wrong, no true moral theory, there is no neutral ground from which to sort out the putatively true moral claims from the ones that simply ring true to some people. Thus, the language of moral realism makes an excellent smoke screen for aggressive or otherwise anti-social behavior, a smoke screen that is so effective it can, and usually does, fool those who employ it. A nation with economic incentives to take over a neighbor’s territory can claim that the neighboring territory really belongs to their nation and that they have a right to it. One might go so far as to say that nations require the language of moral realism to marshal popular support for aggressive actions. Has a military aggressor ever not claimed a moral right to carry out its plans? Has a nation ever been moved to war by leaders who said, “It would be good for us economically, and we can get away with it, so why not?” As Roger Fisher says in Basic Negotiating Strategy (1971, Pg. 110), “Governments are not like bank robbers. People ask ‘What ought I do?’ not ‘What can I get away with?’” Arthur Schlesinger (1971) concurs: “National interest has a self-limiting factor. It cannot, unless transformed by an injection of moral righteousness, produce ideological crusades for unlimited objectives.” As does Kenneth Thompson (1985, pg. 5): “Foreign policy tends to be articulated in moral terms, even in most authoritarian regimes.” As noted above, moral realists naturally interpret the actions and opinions of their (realist) opponents as products of a surreptitious disregard for morality. They see things this way because, to them, the moral truth that has been disregarded by their opponents is so self-evident that only one who willfully disregards morality’s requirements could think and act as their opponents do. People who are evil, people who believe that their actions are wrong and carry on just the same, are native to Hollywood movies and children’s books, but in real life (and good books and films) such characters are few and their influence is negligible. (See Section 5.2.3.) In the real world, the vast majority of avoidable suffering is caused by people who think they have the moral truth on their side.

## case

### wipeout

#### Extinction is good---suffering outweighs the benefits of existence

Joshua Rothman 17 {Joshua Rothman, the ideas editor of the New Yorker citing David Benatar, Associate Professor of Philosophy at University of Cape Town and author of Better To Never Have Been. 11-27-2017. “The Case for Not Being Born.” https://www.newyorker.com/culture/persons-of-interest/the-case-for-not-being-born}//JM

People, in short, say that life is good. Benatar believes that they are mistaken. “The quality of human life is, contrary to what many people think, actually quite appalling,” he writes, in “The Human Predicament.” He provides an escalating list of woes, designed to prove that even the lives of happy people are worse than they think. We’re almost always hungry or thirsty, he writes; when we’re not, we must go to the bathroom. We often experience “thermal discomfort”—we are too hot or too cold—or are tired and unable to nap. We suffer from itches, allergies, and colds, menstrual pains or hot flashes. Life is a procession of “frustrations and irritations”—waiting in traffic, standing in line, filling out forms. Forced to work, we often find our jobs exhausting; even “those who enjoy their work may have professional aspirations that remain unfulfilled.” Many lonely people remain single, while those who marry fight and divorce. “People want to be, look, and feel younger, and yet they age relentlessly”:

They have high hopes for their children and these are often thwarted when, for example, the children prove to be a disappointment in some way or other. When those close to us suffer, we suffer at the sight of it. When they die, we are bereft.

The knee-jerk response to observations like these is, “If life is so bad, why don’t you just kill yourself?” Benatar devotes a forty-three-page chapter to proving that death only exacerbates our problems. “Life is bad, but so is death,” he concludes. “Of course, life is not bad in every way. Neither is death bad in every way. However, both life and death are, in crucial respects, awful. Together, they constitute an existential vise—the wretched grip that enforces our predicament.” It’s better, he argues, not to enter into the predicament in the first place. People sometimes ask themselves whether life is worth living. Benatar thinks that it’s better to ask sub-questions: Is life worth continuing? (Yes, because death is bad.) Is life worth starting? (No.)

Benatar is far from the only anti-natalist. Books such as Sarah Perry’s “Every Cradle Is a Grave” and Thomas Ligotti’s “The Conspiracy Against the Human Race” have also found audiences. There are many “misanthropic anti-natalists”: the Voluntary Human Extinction Movement, for example, has thousands of members who believe that, for environmental reasons, human beings should cease to exist. For misanthropic anti-natalists, the problem isn’t life—it’s us. Benatar, by contrast, is a “compassionate anti-natalist.” His thinking parallels that of the philosopher Thomas Metzinger, who studies consciousness and artificial intelligence; Metzinger espouses digital anti-natalism, arguing that it would be wrong to create artificially conscious computer programs because doing so would increase the amount of suffering in the world. The same argument could apply to human beings.

Like a boxer who has practiced his counters, Benatar has anticipated a range of objections. Many people suggest that the best experiences in life—love, beauty, discovery, and so on—make up for the bad ones. To this, Benatar replies that pain is worse than pleasure is good. Pain lasts longer: “There’s such a thing as chronic pain, but there’s no such thing as chronic pleasure,” he said. It’s also more powerful: would you trade five minutes of the worst pain imaginable for five minutes of the greatest pleasure? Moreover, there’s an abstract sense in which missing out on good experiences isn’t as bad as having bad ones. “For an existing person, the presence of bad things is bad and the presence of good things is good,” Benatar explained. “But compare that with a scenario in which that person never existed—then, the absence of the bad would be good, but the absence of the good wouldn’t be bad, because there’d be nobody to be deprived of those good things.” This asymmetry “completely stacks the deck against existence,” he continued, because it suggests that “all the unpleasantness and all the misery and all the suffering could be over, without any real cost.”

Some people argue that talk of pain and pleasure misses the point: even if life isn’t good, it’s meaningful. Benatar replies that, in fact, human life is cosmically meaningless: we exist in an indifferent universe, perhaps even a “multiverse,” and are subject to blind and purposeless natural forces. In the absence of cosmic meaning, only “terrestrial” meaning remains—and, he writes, there’s “something circular about arguing that the purpose of humanity’s existence is that individual humans should help one another.” Benatar also rejects the argument that struggle and suffering, in themselves, can lend meaning to existence. “I don’t believe that suffering gives meaning,” Benatar said. “I think that people try to find meaning in suffering because the suffering is otherwise so gratuitous and unbearable.” It’s true, he said, that “Nelson Mandela generated meaning through the way he responded to suffering—but that’s not to defend the conditions in which he lived.”

#### Animal suffering outweighs

Ball 3 (Matt, January 5, 2003, Vegan Outreach, Working in Defense of Animals, <http://www.veganoutreach.org/enewsletter/20030105.html>)

A few years into the new millennium, with several decades of animal advocacy behind us, it is shocking that the number of animals exploited and killed in the United States has far more than doubled since 1975. At the same time, the treatment of most of these animals is worse today than ever before. Although every animal in a lab, pound, or fur farm deserves our consideration, ~99 percent of all the animals killed in the United States are killed to be eaten. In recent years, the annual increase in the number of land animals slaughtered for food has been much greater than the total number of animals killed for fur, in labs, and at shelters, combined. In other words, each year in the United States: The number of animals killed in shelters is approximately equal to the human population of New Jersey. The number of animals killed for fur is approximately equal to the human population of Illinois. The number of animals killed in experimentation is approximately equal to the human population of Texas. The increase in the number of land animals farmed and slaughtered is greater than the total human population of the United States. The total number of mammals and birds farmed and slaughtered is approximately equal to one and two-thirds times the entire human population of Earth. Hidden away from the public eye, farmed animals endure an excruciating existence. Written descriptions can't convey the true horror of what goes on in factory farms. [Photographs](http://www.factoryfarming.com/gallery.htm) and [videos](http://www.goveg.com/r-mym.html) come closer – layer hens with open sores, covered with feces, sharing their tiny cage with decomposing corpses of fellow hens whose wings, faces, or feathers were trapped in the cage such that they couldn’t get to food or water (Compassion Over Killing’s “Hope for the Hopeless”); pigs sodomized by metal poles, beaten with bricks, skinned while still conscious (PETA’s “Pig Farm Investigation”); steers, pigs, and birds desperately struggling on the slaughterhouse floor after their throats are cut (Farm Sanctuary’s “Humane Slaughter?”, PETA’s “Meet Your Meat”). But even these tapes can’t communicate the smell, the noise, the desperation, and most of all, the fact that each of these animals – and billions more unseen by any camera or any caring eye – continue to suffer like this, every minute of every day.

#### Cosmogenesis is coming---causes infinite suffering

Tomasik 17 – Brian Tomasik, Researcher, Cofounder and Advisor at the Foundational Research Institute, BS in Computer Science from Swarthmore College, Former Research Assistant at the University of Pennsylvania, Former Software Development Engineer II at Microsoft, “Lab Universes: Creating Infinite Suffering”, Essays on Reducing Suffering, 6-16, https://reducing-suffering.org/lab-universes-creating-infinite-suffering/

Background on lab universes

Some physical theories predict that it may be possible to create new, "baby" universes out of a small amount of matter. Technical reviews of the topic can be found in Stefano Ansoldi and Eduardo I. Guendelman, "Child Universes in the Laboratory," and Gordon McCabe, "How to Create a Universe." Popular-level introductions include the following:A Swarm of Ancient Stars - GPN-2000-000930

--Jim Holt, "The Big Lab Experiment," Slate, 2004

--Zeeya Merali, "Create Your Own Universe," New Scientist, 2006

--Robert Krulwich, "Build Your Own Universe," NPR, 2006.

McCabe explained the concept clearly (p. 6):

Now, one of the most intriguing possibilities opened up by inflation, is the possible creation of a universe 'in a laboratory'. Creation in a laboratory is taken to mean the creation of a physical universe, by design, using the 'artificial' means available to an intelligent species. It is the ability of inflation to maintain a constant energy density, in combination with a period of exponential expansion, which is the key to these laboratory creation scenarios. The idea is to use a small amount of matter in the laboratory, and induce it to undergo inflation until its volume is comparable to that of our own observable universe. The energy density of the inflating region remains constant, and because it becomes the energy density of a huge region, the inflating region acquires a huge total (non-gravitational) energy.

Andrei Linde, one of the founders of inflationary cosmology, put it this way (p. 8):

Indeed, one may need to have only a milligram of matter in a vacuum-like exponentially expanding state, and then the process of self-reproduction will create from this matter not one universe but infinitely many!

Another pioneer of inflation is Alan Guth, the subject of a 1987 New York Times article:

PHYSICISTS often probe the workings of nature on a cosmic scale, but Prof. Alan H. Guth and his colleagues at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology may have set themselves the ultimate research goal. They are seeking a mechanism by which humans might create a new universe from scratch.

Outrageous though such a notion may be, Dr. Guth and his collaborators are perfectly serious about their investigation. "Ten years ago, we couldn't even have posed the question of whether a man-made universe would be possible," he said. "But physics has progressed a long way since then, and today we can ask this and related questions in the real hope of finding scientifically testable answers. We are working in a new and exciting environment."

In his 1997 book, The Inflationary Universe (pp. 268-69), Guth wrote:

To put the story in perspective, one should remember that the process of eternal inflation [postulated by the theory of the self-reproducing inflationary universe ...] leads to an exponential increase in the number of pocket universes on time scales as short as 10-37 seconds. Since the time needed for the development of a super-advanced civilization is measured in billions of years or more, there appears to be no chance that laboratory production of universes could compete with the "natural" process of eternal inflation.

On the other hand, a child universe created in a laboratory by a super-advanced civilization would set into motion its own progression of eternal inflation. Could the super-advanced civilization find a way to enhance its efficiency? We may have to wait a few billion years to find out.

Infinite suffering

Starting a chain of eternal inflation in the laboratory would produce infinitely many new universes. But what types of universes would emerge? Suppose we assume -- as do Jaume Garriga and Alex Vilenkin in their 2001 article "Many worlds in one" -- that there are only finitely many possible universe histories of a particular duration (say, 13.7 billion years, the age of our universe); call these "histories" for short. The existence of infinitely many universes needn't, in general, imply the existence of all possible histories. As Alex Vilenkin notes in his 2006 book Many Worlds in One, the sequence 1, 3, 5, 7, ... contains infinitely many integers but doesn't contain all possible integers, and one might imagine an analogous situation for universe histories (p. 114). However, because "the initial conditions at the big bang are set by random quantum processes during inflation" (p. 114), the theory of inflation does imply that lab universes would instantiate all possible histories infinitely many times (with probability one -- see the second Borel-Cantelli lemma). This would, of course, include infinitely many replications of the Holocaust, infinitely many acts of torture, and so on. Indeed, there would be infinitely many universes in which Hitler won World War II, as well as infinitely many universes that would be as close as physically possible to "hell on earth" (or on any other planet). The assumption of finitely many possible histories is not really important. As long as we assume that the probability is greater than zero that suffering will emerge in a random universe, creating infinitely many universes would create infinite amounts of suffering.

#### Humans will create evil AI---causes infinite torture

**Turchin and Denkenberger 18** {Turchin is a researcher at the Science for Life Extension Foundation; Denkenberger is with the Global Catastrophic Risk Institute (GCRI) @ Tennessee State University, Alliance to Feed the Earth in Disasters (ALLFED). 5-3-2018. “Classification of Global Catastrophic Risks Connected with Artificial Intelligence.”}//JM

6.4. AI that is programmed to be evil We could imagine a perfectly aligned AI, which was deliberately programmed to be bad by its creators. For example, a hacker could create an AI with a goal of killing all humans or torturing them. The Foundational Research Institute suggested the notion of s-risks, that is, the risks of extreme future suffering, probably by wrongly aligned AI (Daniel 2017). AI may even upgrade humans to make them feel more suffering, like in the short story “I have no mouth but I must scream” (Ellison 1967). The controversial idea of “Roko’s Basilisk” is that a future AI may torture people who did not do enough to create this malevolent AI. This idea has attracted attention in the media and is an illustration of “acausal” (not connected by causal links) blackmail by future AI (Auerbach 2014). However, this cannot happen unless many people take the proposition seriously.

#### Humans will try to explore black holes---risks spaghettification

Bill Andrews 19 {Senior Associate Editor for Discover Magazine, citing NASA research on black holes. 7-30-2019. “If Wormholes Exist, Could We Really Travel Through Them?” https://www.discovermagazine.com/the-sciences/if-wormholes-exist-could-we-really-travel-through-them}//JM

The second issue is that, despite years of research, scientists still aren’t really sure how wormholes would work. Can any technology ever create and manipulate them, or are they simply a part of the universe? Do they stay open forever, or are they only traversable for a limited time? And perhaps most significantly, are they stable enough to allow for human travel?

The answer to all of these: We just don’t know.

But that doesn’t mean scientists aren’t working on it. Despite the lack of actual wormholes to study, researchers can still model and test Einstein’s equations. NASA’s conducted legitimate wormhole research for decades, and a team described just this year how wormhole-based travel might be more feasible than previously thought.

That research concerned one of the most popular conceptions of wormholes, with black holes serving as one of the openings. But black holes are famously dangerous, possibly stretching apart anyone who approaches too close. It turns out, though, that some black holes might allow objects to pass through relatively easily. This would allow a traveler to explore the space beyond, and thus eliminate one of the biggest hurdles to entering such a wormhole. But again, that’s only if they exist in the first place.

So, until we either find an actual wormhole to study, or realize that they can’t help us explore the universe, we’ll have to do it the old fashioned way: By taking rockets the long way around, and taking our minds on fictional adventures.

#### Spaghettification causes infinite suffering

Harry Pettit 19 {Formerly a science and technology reporter at MailOnline, Harry Pettit joined The Sun in December 2018. He holds an undergrad degree in Physiology from the University of Manchester and a Masters degree in Science Communication from Imperial College London. 4-11-2019. “What happens if you fall into a black hole? Infinite suffering, body ‘spaghettification’ and your past.” https://www.thesun.co.uk/tech/8839382/what-happens-fall-in-black-hole/}//JM

'Spaghettification' Black holes are blobs of unbelievably dense matter with a gravitational pull millions of times greater than the force we feel on Earth. If you got too close, these gargantuan forces would pull your body apart. As you got closer, the difference in gravity between your head and your feet would stretch you out like a piece of chewing gum. Scientists affectionately call this process "spaghettification". You eventually become a stream of subatomic particles that swirl into the black hole like water down a plug. According to TV physicist Neil De Grasse Tyson: "As you get closer and closer, the force of gravity grows astronomically. You stay whole until the stretching force exceeds the molecular bonds of your body's flesh. "At that moment, your body would snap into two segments. Everything of you that ever was gets funnelled to the black hole's centre. "Not only have you been ripped in half – you've been extruded through the fabric of space and time like toothpaste through a tube." Live forever The bigger a black hole is, the smaller its gravitational pull. That's led some experts to ponder whether larger black holes would spaghettify you at all, as the forces aren't strong enough to pull you apart. Instead, getting caught in one of these beauties could help you cheat death altogether. Time is said to freeze at the edge of a black hole, due its extreme forces bending the very fabric of space and time. If you reach this spot without being torn apart, you could become immortal – well, almost.

#### S-risks outweigh extinction

Daniel 17 – Max Daniel, Executive Director of the Foundational Research Institute, Senior Research Scholar at the Future of Humanity Institute, MS in Mathematics from Heidelberg University, “S-Risks: Why They Are The Worst Existential Risks, And How To Prevent Them”, Foundational Research Institute, https://foundational-research.org/s-risks-talk-eag-boston-2017/

To come back to the title of my talk, I can now state why s-risks are the worst existential risks. S-risks are the worst existential risks because I’ll define them to have the largest possible scope and the largest possible severity. (I will qualify the claim that s-risks are the worst x-risks later.) That is, I’d like to suggest the following definition. “S-risk – One where an adverse outcome would bring about severe suffering on a cosmic scale, vastly exceeding all suffering that has existed on Earth so far.” So, s-risks are roughly as severe as factory farming, but with an even larger scope. To better understand this definition, let’s zoom in on the part of the map that shows existential risk. One subclass of risks are those that, with respect to their scope, would affect all future human generations, and, with respect to their severity, would remove everything valuable. One central example of such pan-generational, crushing risks are risks of human extinction. Risks of extinction have received the most attention so far. But, conceptually, x-risks contain another class of risks. These are risks of outcomes even worse than extinction in two respects. First, with respect to their scope, they not only threaten the future generations of humans or our successors, but all sentient life in the whole universe. Second, with respect to their severity, they not only remove everything that would be valuable but also come with a lot of disvalue – that is, features we’d like to avoid no matter what. Recall the story I told in the beginning, but think of Greta’s solitary confinement being multiplied by many orders of magnitude – for instance, because it affects a very large population of sentient uploads.

# 2NC

## K

### 2NC---OV

#### It makes genocide inevitable

**Zupancic 2K** (Ethics of the Real: Kant and Lacan, March 2000, p. 96-7, Google Books)

“Another problem still remains, however: the question of the possibility of (performing) an ethical act. Is it at all possible for a human subject to accomplish an (ethical) act - or, more precisely, is it possible that something like an Act actually occurs in (empirical) reality? Or does it exists only in a series of failures which only some supreme Being can see as a whole, as an Act? If we are to break. out of the `logic of fantasy', framed by the postulates of immortality and God (the point of view of the Supreme Being), we have to assert that Acts do in fact occur in reality. In other words, we have to `attack' Kant on his exclusion of the `highest good' and the `highest (or diabolical) evil' as impossible for human agents. But does this not mean that we thereby give in to another fantasy, and simply substitute one fantasy for another? Would this kind of claim not imply that we have to `phenomenalize' the Law, abolish the internal division or alienation of human will, and assert the existence of devilish and/or angelic beings? This point was in fact made by Joan Copjec,16 who defends Kant against critics who reproach him for - as she puts it - `lack of intellectual nerve,' for not having enough courage to admit the possibility of diabolical evil. The attempt to think diabolical evil (as a real possibility) turns out, according to this argument, to be another attempt to deny the will's self-alienation, and to make of the will a pure, positive force. This amounts to a voluntarist reading of Kant's philosophy, combined with the romantic notion of the possibility of a refusal of the Law. We do not contest the validity of this argument per se. But the problem is that it leaves us with an image of Kantian ethics which is not very far from what we might call an `ethics of tragic resignation': a man is only a man; he is finite, divided in himself - and therein lies his uniqueness, his tragic glory. A man is not God, and he should not try to act like God, because if he does, he will inevitably cause evil. The problem with this stance is that it fails to recognize the real source of evil (in the common sense of the word). Let us take the example which is most frequently used, the Holocaust: what made it possible for the Nazis to torture and kill millions of Jews was not simply that they thought they were gods, and could therefore decide who would live and who would die, but the fact that they saw themselves as instruments of God (or some other Idea), who had already decided who could live and who must die. Indeed, what is most dangerous is not an insignificant bureaucrat who thinks he is God but, rather, the God who pretends to be an insignificant bureaucrat. One could even say that, for the subject, the most difficult thing is to accept that, in a certain sense, she is `God', that she has a choice. Hence the right answer to the religious promise of immortality is not the pathos of the finite; the basis of ethics cannot be an imperative which commands us to endorse our finitude and renounce our `higher', `impossible' aspirations but, rather, an imperative which invites us to recognize as our own the `infinite' which can occur as something that is `essentially a by-product' of our actions.

### 2NC---FW

#### Their form of scenario planning entrenches distanced knowledge production that props up ideological hegemony

Chow 6 Rey Chow, Andrew W. Mellon professor of the humanities at Brown, The Age of the World Target, pg. 38-41

In the decades since 1945, whether in dealing with the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China, North Korea, Vietnam, and countries in Central America, or during the Gulf Wars, the United States has been conducting war on the basis of a certain kind of knowledge production, and producing knowledge on the basis of war. War and knowledge enable and foster each other primarily through the collective fantasizing of some foreign or alien body that poses danger to the "self" and the "eye" that is the nation. Once the monstrosity of this foreign body is firmly established in the national consciousness, the decision makers of the U.S. government often talk and behave as though they had no choice but war.38 War, then, is acted out as a moral obligation to expel an imagined dangerous alienness from the United States' self-concept as the global custodian of freedom and democracy. Put in a different way, the "moral element," insofar as it produces knowledge about the "self" and "other"—and hence the "eye" and its "target"—as such, justifies war by its very dichotomizing logic. Conversely, the violence of war, once begun, fixes the other in its attributed monstrosity and affirms the idealized image of the self. In this regard, the pernicious stereotyping of the Japanese during the Second World War—not only by U.S. military personnel but also by social and behavioral scientists—was simply a flagrant example of an ongoing ideological mechanism that had accompanied Western treatments of non-Western "others" for centuries. In the hands of academics such as Geoffrey Gorer, writes Dower, the notion that was collectively and "objectively" formed about the Japanese was that they were "a clinically compulsive and probably collectively neurotic people, whose lives were governed by ritual and 'situational ethics,' wracked with insecurity, and swollen with deep, dark currents of repressed resentment and aggression."39 As Dower points out, such stereotyping was by no means accidental or unprecedented: The Japanese, so "unique" in the rhetoric of World War Two, were actually saddled with racial stereotypes that Europeans and Americans had applied to nonwhites for centuries: during the conquest of the New World, the slave trade, the Indian wars in the United States, the agitation against Chinese immigrants in America, the colonization of Asia and Africa, the U.S. conquest of the Philippines at the turn of the century. These were stereotypes, moreover, which had been strongly reinforced by nineteenth-century Western science. In the final analysis, in fact, these favored idioms denoting superiority and inferiority transcended race and represented formulaic expressions of Self and Other in general."' The moralistic divide between "self" and "other" constitutes the production of knowledge during the U.S. Occupation of Japan after the Second World War as well. As Monica Braw writes, in the years immediately after 1945, the risk that the United States would be regarded as barbaric and inhumane was carefully monitored, in the main by cutting off Japan from the rest of the world through the ban on travel, control of private mail, and censorship of research, mass media information, and other kinds of communication. The entire Occupation policy was permeated by the view that "the United States was not to be accused; guilt was only for Japan":41 As the Occupation of Japan started, the atmosphere was military. Japan was a defeated enemy that must be subdued. The Japanese should be taught their place in the world: as a defeated nation, Japan had no status and was entitled to no respect. People should be made to realize that any catastrophe that had befallen them was of their own making. Until they had repented, they were suspect. If they wanted to release information about the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, it could only be for the wrong rea-sons, such as accusing the United States of inhumanity. Thus this information was suppressed.42 As in the scenario of aerial bombing, the elitist and aggressive panoramic "vision" in which the other is beheld means that the sufferings of the other matter much less than the transcendent aspirations of the self. And, despite being the products of a particular culture's technological fanaticism, such transcendent aspirations are typically expressed in the form of selfless universalisms. As Sherry puts it, "The reality of Hiroshima and Nagasaki seemed less important than the bomb's effect on 'mankind's destiny,' on 'humanity's choice,' on 'what is happening to men's minds,' and on hopes (now often extravagantly revived) to achieve world government."'" On Ja-pan's side, as Yoneyama writes, such a "global narrative of the universal history of humanity" has helped sustain "a national victimology and phantasm of innocence throughout most of the postwar years." Going one step further, she remarks: "The idea that Hiroshima's disaster ought to be remembered from the transcendent and anonymous position of humanity .. . .might best be described as 'nuclear universalism.' "44 Once the relations among war, racism, and knowledge production are underlined in these terms, it is no longer possible to assume, as some still do, that the recognizable features of modern war—its impersonality, coerciveness, and deliberate cruelty—are "divergences" from the "antipathy" to violence and to conflict that characterize the modern world.45 Instead, it would be incumbent on us to realize that the pursuit of war— with its use of violence—and the pursuit of peace—with its cultivation of knowledge—are the obverse and reverse of the same coin, the coin that I have been calling "the age of the world target." Rather than being irreconcilable opposites, war and peace are coexisting, collaborative functions in the continuum of a virtualized world. More crucially still, only the privileged nations of the world can afford to wage war and preach peace at one and the same time. As Sherry writes, "The United States had different resources with which to be fanatical: resources allowing it to take the lives of others more than its own, ones whose accompanying rhetoric of technique disguised the will to destroy."45 From this it follows that, if indeed political and military acts of cruelty are not unique to the United States—a point which is easy enough to substantiate—what is nonetheless remarkable is the manner in which such acts are, in the United States, usually cloaked in the form of enlightenment and altruism, in the form of an aspiration simultaneously toward technological perfection and the pursuit of peace. In a country in which political leaders are held accountable for their decisions by an electorate, violence simply cannot—as it can in totalitarian countries—exist in the raw. Even the most violent acts must be adorned with a benign, rational story. It is in the light of such interlocking relations among war, racism, and knowledge production that I would make the following comments about area studies, the academic establishment that crystallizes the connection between the epistemic targeting of the world and the "humane" practices of peacetime learning. From Atomic Bombs to Area Studies As its name suggests, area studies as a mode of knowledge production is, strictly speaking, military in its origins. Even though the study of the history, languages, and literatures of, for instance, "Far Eastern" cultures existed well before the Second World War (in what Edward W. Said would term the old Orientalist tradition predicated on philology), the systematization of such study under the rubric of special geopolitical areas was largely a postwar and U.S. phenomenon. In H. D. Harootunian's words, "The systematic formation of area studies, principally in major universities, was .. . a massive attempt to relocate the enemy in the new configuration of the Cold War."47 As Bruce Cumings puts it: "It is now fair to say, based on the declassified evidence, that the American state and especially the intelligence elements in it shaped the entire field of postwar area studies, with the clearest and most direct impact on those regions of the world where communism was strongest: Russia, Central and Eastern Europe, and East Asia."48 In the decades after 1945, when the United States competed with the Soviet Union for the power to rule and/or destroy the world, these regions were the ones that required continued, specialized super-vision; to this list we may also add Southeast Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East. As areas to be studied, these regions took on the significance of target fields—fields of information retrieval and dissemination that were necessary for the perpetuation of the United States' political and ideological hegemony. In the final part of his classic Orientalism, Said describes area studies as a continuation of the old European Orientalism with a different pedagogical emphasis: No longer does an Orientalist try first to master the esoteric languages of the Orient; he begins instead as a trained social scientist and "applies" his science to the Orient, or anywhere else. This is the specifically American contribution to the history of Orientalism, and it can be dated roughly from the period immediately following World War II, when the United States found itself in the position recently vacated by Britain and France." Whereas Said draws his examples mainly from Islamic and Middle Eastern area studies, Cumings provides this portrait of the Fast Asian target field: The Association for Asian Studies (AAS) was the first "area" organization in the U.S., founded in 1943 as the Far Eastern Association and reorganized as the AAS in 1956. Before 1945 there had been little attention to and not much funding for such things; but now the idea was to bring contemporary social science theory to bear on the non-Western world, rather than continue to pursue the classic themes of Oriental studies, often examined through philology. . In return for their sufferance, the Orientalists would get vastly enhanced academic resources (positions, libraries, language studies)—and soon, a certain degree of separation which came from the social scientists inhabiting institutes of East Asian studies, whereas the Orientalists occupied departments of East Asian languages and cultures. This implicit Faustian bargain sealed the postwar academic deal.50 A largely administrative enterprise, closely tied to policy, the new American Orientalism took over from the old Orientalism attitudes of cultural hostility, among which is, as Said writes, the dogma that "the Orient is at bottom something either to be feared (the Yellow Peril, the Mongol hordes, the brown dominions) or to be controlled (by pacification, research and development, outright occupation whenever possible)."" Often under the modest apparently innocuous agendas of fact gathering and documentation, the “scientific” and “objective” production of knowledge during peacetime about the various special “areas” became the institutional practice that substantiated and elaborated the militaristic conception of the world as target. In other words, despite the claims about the apolitical and disinterested nature of the pursuit of higher learning, activities undertaken under the rubric of area studies, such as language training. Historiography, anthropology, economics, political science, and so forth, are fully inscribed in the politics and ideology of war. To that extent, the disciplining, research, and development of so-called academic information are part and parcel of a strategic logic. And yet, if the production of knowledge (with its vocabulary of aims and goals, research, data analysis, experimentation, and verification) in fact shares the same scientific and military premises as war—if, for instance, the ability to translate a difficult language can be regarded as equivalent to the ability to break military codes—is it a surprise that it is doomed to fail in its avowed attempts to “know” the other cultures? Can “knowledge” that is derived from the same kinds of bases as war put an end to the violence of warfare, or is such knowledge not simply warfare’s accomplice, destined to destroy rather than preserve the forms of lives at which it aims to focus? As long as knowledge is produced in this self-referential manner, as a circuit of targeting or getting the other that ultimately consolidates the omnipotence and omnipresence of the sovereign “self”/“eye”—the “I”—that is the United States, the other will have no choice but remain just that—a target whose existence justifies only one thing, its destruction by the bomber. As long as the focus of our study of Asia remains by the United States, and as long as this focus is not accompanied by knowledge of what is happening elsewhere at other times as well as the present, such study will ultimately confirm once again the self-referential function of virtual worlding that was unleashed by the dropping of the atomic bombs, with the United States always occupying the position of the bomber, and other cultures always viewed as the military and information target fields. In this manner, events whose historicity does not fall into the epistemically closed orbit of the atomic bomber—such as the Chinese reactions to the war from a primarily anti-Japanese point of view that I alluded to at the beginning of this chapter—will never receive the attention that is due to them. “Knowledge,” however conscientiously gathered and however large in volume, will lead only to further silence and to the silencing of diverse experiences. This is one reason why, as Harootunian remark, area studies have been, since its inception, haunted by the “absence of definable object”—and by “the problem of the vanishing object.”

#### Predictability is life denying

**Grimm 77** ([Ruediger Hermann, art historian and Goethe scholar, *Nietzsche's Theory of Knowledge*, ed. M. Montinari, W. Miiller-Lauter & H. Wenzel, Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, pg. 30-33, Gender modified]

Western logic and metaphysics have been traditionally founded upon a handful of principles which were regarded as being self-evidently true, and therefore neither requiring nor admitting of any further proof40• One of these principles we have already dealt with at some length, the notion that truth must be unchanging. Rather than further belabor the whole question of truth, we shall now turn to Nietzsche's analysis of why it is that truth should be regarded as necessarily unchanging in the first place. Nietzsche's view of reality (the will to power) is such that all that exists is an ever-changing chaos of power-quanta, continually struggling with one another for hegemony. Nothing remains the same from one instant to the next. Consequently there are no stable objects, no "identical cases," no facts, and no order. Whatever order we see in the world, we ourselves have projected into it. By itself, the world has no order : there is no intrinsically stable "world order," no "nature." Yet metaphysics, logic, and language indeed, our whole conceptual scheme is grounded in the assumption that there is such a stable order. Why? . • . die Annahme des seienden ist nothig, um denken und schliessen zu konnen : die Logik handhabt our Formeln fiir Gleichbleibendes deshalb ware diese Annahme noch ohne Beweiskraft fiir die Reali tat : ,,das Seiende" gehort zu unserer Optik48• This can perhaps be best clarified by anticipating our discussion of Nietzsche's perspectivism. Even if reality is a chaos of power-quanta, about which any statement is already an interpretation and "falsification," we nevertheless must assume some sort of order and continuity in order to function at all. But the assumption of order and continuity even if it is a necessary assumption is certainly not any sort of proof. We ourselves, as will to power, gain control over our environment by "interpreting" it, by simplifying and adapting it to our requirements. Life itself is an ongoing process of interpretation, a process of imposing a superficial order upon a chaotic reality. In Wahrheit ist Interpretation ein Mittel selbst, um Herr iiber etwas zu werden. (Der organische Prozess setzt fortwahrendes /nterpretieren voraus42• Thus we create for ourselves a world in which we can live and function and further enhance and increase our will to power. Even our perceptual apparatus is not geared to gleaning "truth" from the objects of our experience. Rather, it arranges, structures, and interprets these objects so that we can gain control over them and utilize them for our own ends. The "truth" about things is something we ourselves have projected onto them purely for the purpose of furthering our own power. Thus Nietzsche can say Wahrheit ist die Art von Irrthum, ohne welche eine bestimmte Art von lebendigen Wesen nicht leben konnte. Der Werth fiir das Leben entscheidet zuletzt43. Thus the "truth" about reality is simply a variety of error, a convenient fiction which is nevertheless necessary for our maintenance. In the last analysis it is not a question of "truth" at all, but rather, a matter of which "fiction," which interpretation of reality best enables me to survive and increase my power. In an absolute sense, the traditional standard of unchanging truth is no more true or false than Nietzsche's own. But on the basis of Nietzsche's criterion for truth we can make a vital distinction. All statements about the truth or falsity of our experiential world are functions of the will to power, and in this sense, all equally true (or false). The difference lies in the degree to which any particular interpretation increases or decreases our power. The notion that truth is unchanging is the interpretation of a comparatively weak will to power, which demands that the world be simple, reliable, predictable, i. e. "true." Constant change, ambiguity, contradiction, paradox, etc. are much more difficult to cope with, and require a comparatively high degree of will to power to be organized (i. e. interpreted) into a manageable environment. The ambiguous and contradictory the unknown is frightening and threatening. Therefore we have constructed for ourselves a model of reality which is eminently "knowable," and consequently subject to our control. Pain and suffering have traditionally been held to stem from "ignorance" about the way the world "really" is : the more predictable and reliable the world is, the less our chances are of suffering through error, of being unpleasantly surprised. However, " darin driickt sich eine gedriickte Seele aus, voller MIBtrauen und schlimmer Erfahrung . . . 44." The demand that reality and truth be stable, reliable, predictable, and conveniently at our disposal is a symptom of weakness. The glossing over of the chaotic, contradictory, changing aspect of reality is the sign of a will to power which must reduce the conflict and competition in the world to a minimum. Yet resistance and competition are the very factors which enable any particular power-constellation to express itself and grow in power. As we saw earlier, the will to power can only express itself by meeting resistance, and any interpretation of reality which attempts to minimize these factors is profoundly anti-life (since life is will to power). Furthermore, a person embodying a strong and vigorous will to power will "interpret" the "threatening" aspect of the world the chaos, ambiguity, contradiction, danger, etc. as stimuli, which continually offer [them] a high degree of resistance which [they] must meet and overcome if [they are] to survive and grow. Rather than negate change and make the world predictable, a "strong" person would, according to Nietzsche, welcome the threat and challenge of a constantly changing world. Referring to those who require a world as changeless as possible in order to survive, Nietzsche says . . . (eine umgekehrte Art Mensch wiirde diesen Wechsel zum Reiz rechnen) Eine mit Kraft iiberladene und spielende Art W esen wiirde gerade die Aff ekte, die Unvernunft und den Wechsel in eudamonistischem Sinne gutheissen, sammt ihren Consequenzen, Gefahr, Contrast, Zu-Grunde-gehn usw-45. A large part of the intellectual energy of the West has been spent in trying to discover "facts," "laws of nature," etc., all of which are conceived to be "truths" and which, therefore, do not change. For Nietzsche, this conceptualization of our experience is tantamount to a "mummification" : when an experience is conceptualized, it is wrenched from the everchanging stream of becoming which is the world. By turning our experiences into facts, concepts, truths, statistics, etc. we "kill" them, rob them of their immediacy and vitality and embalm them, thus transforming them into the convenient bits of knowledge which furnish our comfortable, predictable, smug existences46• Der Mensch sucht ,,die Wahrheit" : eine Welt, die nicht sich widerspricht, nicht tiiuscht, nicht wechselt, eine wahre Welt, eine Welt, in der man nicht leidet : Widerspruch, Tauschung, Wechsel Ursachen des Leidens l47 For Nietzsche, this whole tendency to negate change which is so intimately connected with the presupposition that "truth" always means "unchanging, eternal truth," is a symptom of decadence, a symptom of the weakening and disruption of the will to power. This outlook says, in effect, "This far shall you go, and this much shall you learn, but no more than this . . . . " In the absence of any fixed and ultimate standard for truth, of course, this outlook is no more true or false than Nietzsche's own. Yet it is not a question here of rightness or wrongness, but a question of power. More specifically, it is a matter of vital power. "Der Werth fur das Leben entscheidet zuletzt48." Nietzsche's conclusion is that this static world interpretation has a negative, depressing effect on a person's vital energies (will to power). It constricts growth, it sets limits and hampers the self-assertion of the will to power. The strong individual, whom Nietzsche so much admires, flourishes only in an environment of change, ambiguity, contradiction, and danger. The chaotic and threatening aspect of the world is a stimulus for such individuals, demanding that they constantly grow and increase their power, or perish49• It demands that they constantly exceed their previous limits, realize their creative potential and surpass it, become more than they were. In the absence of any stability in the world, the strong individual who can flourish in such an environment is radically free from any constraint, radically free to create. It need scarcely be said that this world-interpretation is immeasurably more conducive to the growth and enhancement of the will to power than the static worldview. And the increase of will to power is Nietzsche's only criterion : Alles Geschehen, alle Bewegung, alles Werden als ein Feststellen von Gradund Kraftverhaltnissen, als ein Kampf . . .0 0

### 2NC---AT: Case Outweighs/Util

#### 3---Metaphysics precedes materialism

Seth **Segall 15**. Zen priest and psychologist. 2015. Retired member of the clinical faculty of the Yale University School of Medicine and the former Director of Psychology at Waterbury Hospital, Buddhism and Moral Coherence, <http://www.existentialbuddhist.com/2015/12/buddhism-and-moral-coherence/>

The Bodhisattva Path offers a telos, a final end, for us and Nature: we’re here to help all beings awaken, and because of Dependent Origination, the whole of reality supports us in this endeavor. It’s not just our endeavor, it’s the Universe’s. As the 13th Century Japanese Buddhist monk Eihei Dogen might say, “earth, grasses and trees, fences and walls, tiles and pebbles” co-participate in our enlightenment, our enlightenment transforming space and time as we co-awaken with the whole of reality. Within this non-dual framework, our purpose is to cultivate wisdom and compassion. It’s this purpose that provides an external standard for judging the morality of actions: Actions that help ourselves and others to actualize wisdom (i.e., the realization of emptiness, impermanence, unsatisfactoriness, non-self, and non-duality) and facilitate mindful awareness, non-harming, compassion and non-grasping are moral. Actions that detract from it are immoral. We instantiate this moral process in all of our activities, e.g., in meditating, raising and educating children, dealing wisely and compassionately with others, being mindful in speech and behavior, exercising restraint in our desires, and so on. In After Virtue (1981), Alasdair MacIntyre argues that morality achieves coherence through embeddedness within a cultural matrix of supporting practices, narratives and traditions. Buddhism happily provides all three. Unfortunately, these general Buddhist principles fail to provide a means for resolving conflicts between specific moral intuitions. What if, in saving the baby drowning in the well, we’ve saved the baby Hitler? What if a compassionate action helps one person but disadvantages another? What if an act of mercy towards a perpetrator leaves an injured party aggrieved? What if saving an endangered species creates economic hardship for people living nearby? The answers to these sorts of questions often entail a resort to some kind of moral calculus, as if all goods could be measured against each other on the same scale, when in fact they are, often enough, incommensurable. While in Buddhism compassion trumps everything else, the primacy of compassion can’t resolve the question of “compassion towards whom?” when people are differentially affected by actions. All philosophies face this problem of what to do when “goods” conflict. Sometimes we just have to face the tragic implications of how life is structured with something approaching resignation or grace. Buddhist principles can anchor our ethics in a telos, but in and of themselves, can provide only minimal guidance on how to settle these disputes. Since Buddhism never developed its own tradition of critical ethical investigation, it may sometimes have to allow non-Buddhist philosophers to come to its aid with their ungainly mix of consequentialist, utilitarian, deontological, and virtue ethics to help think things through. Deciding what’s right is often complicated, but that doesn’t have to mean that the notion of “right” itself needs be incoherent. The problem with this second Buddhist solution is that one has to buy it’s premises for it to work. Not everyone can do so. Materialists, for example, could never buy into the premise that we have a purpose, or that our purpose is part of a larger narrative of everything “waking up.” As a result, Western Buddhism has secular adherents who try to fit significant portions of the Buddhist project into a materialist frame. For secularists, the end point of Buddhist practice is again some version of eudaemonia, and the active Buddhist ingredients contributing to this eudaemonia include elements of mindfulness and compassion. Their answer to the question, “why be mindful or compassionate?” needs be a utilitarian one: it contributes to one’s feeling happier and facilitates one’s capacity to make others feel happier. This probably provides sufficient reason for many people to engage in secularized Buddhist practice; after all, who wouldn’t want to be happier? What it doesn’t provide is a reason why the Buddhist path to happiness is superior to everyone just taking some Valium. The secular response to this requires a theory of why some types of happiness are superior to others, and this requires a theory of what human beings are for, and how they’re supposed to be—just the sort of thing that secularists tend to shy away from. For example, in his book Flourish (2011), positive psychologist Martin Seligman posits a model of eudaemonia that includes the five factors of positive emotion, engagement, accomplishment, relationship, and meaning. It’s not a bad list, but it begs the question of “why these factors and not others?” since it lacks a larger theory of what human beings are for. Seligman defines meaning as “belonging to and serving something you believe is bigger than oneself.” This definition suggests that we’re all free to find our own meaning — that one person’s meaning is as good as another’s, whether one is a Bodhisattva, a Fascist, or an acolyte of the Islamic State. Whatever makes you feel you’re part of some larger story. You can see the inherent problem: we’re left with no way to establish a hierarchy of goodness within the universe of possible meanings. Secularized accounts can never adequately address questions of goodness without grounding the concept in some larger theory of what our lives are all about. That means acknowledging that human lives are, in fact, about something. Everyone, knowingly or not, has a metaphysics. A materialist metaphysics can’t account for consciousness and value, and leaves our lives devoid of meaning. Materialism suggests our lives aren’t about anything — they’re just accidental byproducts of physical processes. Materialism can’t be empirically proven or disproven, any more than pan-psychism or teleology can. It’s just more or less useful, and depending on your point of view, more or less credible. I think the Buddhist story has something special to contribute to our survival as a species. It clarifies our deep interrelationship with all beings and with Nature, clarifies our moral duties towards all beings without exception, and encourages us to move beyond the fragmented individualism and consumer mentality that are the twin scourges of modern Western society. As our fragile species lurches toward the possibility of extinction, we moderns are increasingly the inheritors of a conflicting set of historical grievances and irreconcilable world-views, while simultaneously the possessors of technologies that extend our ability to inflict exponentially greater harm on each other. Our current moral incoherence will not let us muddle through. Something very much like Buddhist ethics seems increasingly urgent if we’re going to make sufficient progress in resolving these conflicts to survive as a species. The Buddhist solution, however, requires us to think differently about Nature and our place in it. It also requires us to assume something very much like the Bodhisattva ideal — the belief that there’s a more enlightened way to be than the way-we-are-now (however we construe “Enlightenment”) and that an engaged, compassionate regard for others is an indispensable component of that enlightened way.

#### 4---Death is inevitable, dharma solves, and our impacts outweigh

Hudson, Director of Psychological Health for the U.S. Air Force, 11 (Joshua, Should We Fear Death?, https://appliedbuddhism.com/2011/06/21/should-we-fear-death/)

The Buddha decided to look at a “Middle Path.” All things are impermanent (anicca), but life is more than just the small clip of experience we see in one lifetime. The concept of life starting and stopping from cradle to grave is an optical illusion. The cravings (tanha) to exist creates enough fear that we no longer see the continual evolution and little deaths that we bring every year, month, day, hour, minute, moment in our lives. The changes are too subtle to notice appropriately so we ignore them. So too, it is the Buddhist philosophy that our existence is equally ignorant of the continuity of our suffering and karma. Since we cannot see how our continuity works beyond the death of the body, we fear what comes next; or worse, we speculate. No one really knows what happens beyond death accept. We take it on faith that those who have reached enlightenment have the ability to see so clearly that they can look (literally or metaphorically) backwards and forwards beyond the time of birth and death. Nevertheless, the Kalamasutta tells us that we can only know for sure if we put the teachings into practice and eventually see for ourselves. All that is sure is the truth of the dharma, which has over the past 2,600 years to be true. It is continually being proven over and over again by science and practice. If the dharma of the world around us is true, then we must look with some credibility that the dharma of the after-life has some merit as well, because it uses the same observational logic. Not all of the teachings of Buddhism are purely the teachings of the Buddha. Some traditions have bardo a land of limbo, while others have the “Pure Lands”, and others have defined mystical realms. These are not the teachings of the Buddha Gautama, but later speculations from later Buddhas. Their veracity must be determined by the individual, just as every Christian must decide what their definition of heaven and hell is. The three heavenly messengers revealed to the Buddha were aging, illness and death. Aging and illness ultimately leads to death. These are the three qualities of existence that people avoid the most, because they are the three markers that deal with our mortality—the impermanent nature of being. In order to understand the nature of suffering, we must first stop avoiding the realities of being and embrace these three qualities in their entirety. Whether we wish to avoid sickness, aging or death or not is irrelevant. The truth of existence is that all things are temporary and will age, decay and eventually pass away. Therefore the fear that we have of not being, or at least being deprived of existence is irrational, mostly because to be afraid of death implies that there is some influence we can have over it. Like the serenity prayer states, “Grant me the serenity to accept the things I cannot change, the courage to change the things I can and the wisdom to know the difference.” And yet, death is one area of our lives we ignore because we cannot accept it, we feel that we can change the outcome and we are ignorant to see death’s inevitability. But what is there to really be afraid of? What is really dying? If we see ourselves as a permanent identity, then there IS a great loss and deprivation of being. However, if we are just a process of being that has arisen and will eventually pass, we can see that our passing is just one more stage in the next becoming. It is only a chapter in a larger book.

#### 5---Absent the alternative, the sheer magnitude of human suffering outweighs extinction

Joshua Rothman 17 {Joshua Rothman, the ideas editor of the New Yorker citing David Benatar, Associate Professor of Philosophy at University of Cape Town and author of Better To Never Have Been. 11-27-2017. “The Case for Not Being Born.” https://www.newyorker.com/culture/persons-of-interest/the-case-for-not-being-born}//JM

People, in short, say that life is good. Benatar believes that they are mistaken. “The quality of human life is, contrary to what many people think, actually quite appalling,” he writes, in “The Human Predicament.” He provides an escalating list of woes, designed to prove that even the lives of happy people are worse than they think. We’re almost always hungry or thirsty, he writes; when we’re not, we must go to the bathroom. We often experience “thermal discomfort”—we are too hot or too cold—or are tired and unable to nap. We suffer from itches, allergies, and colds, menstrual pains or hot flashes. Life is a procession of “frustrations and irritations”—waiting in traffic, standing in line, filling out forms. Forced to work, we often find our jobs exhausting; even “those who enjoy their work may have professional aspirations that remain unfulfilled.” Many lonely people remain single, while those who marry fight and divorce. “People want to be, look, and feel younger, and yet they age relentlessly”:

They have high hopes for their children and these are often thwarted when, for example, the children prove to be a disappointment in some way or other. When those close to us suffer, we suffer at the sight of it. When they die, we are bereft.

The knee-jerk response to observations like these is, “If life is so bad, why don’t you just kill yourself?” Benatar devotes a forty-three-page chapter to proving that death only exacerbates our problems. “Life is bad, but so is death,” he concludes. “Of course, life is not bad in every way. Neither is death bad in every way. However, both life and death are, in crucial respects, awful. Together, they constitute an existential vise—the wretched grip that enforces our predicament.” It’s better, he argues, not to enter into the predicament in the first place. People sometimes ask themselves whether life is worth living. Benatar thinks that it’s better to ask sub-questions: Is life worth continuing? (Yes, because death is bad.) Is life worth starting? (No.)

Benatar is far from the only anti-natalist. Books such as Sarah Perry’s “Every Cradle Is a Grave” and Thomas Ligotti’s “The Conspiracy Against the Human Race” have also found audiences. There are many “misanthropic anti-natalists”: the Voluntary Human Extinction Movement, for example, has thousands of members who believe that, for environmental reasons, human beings should cease to exist. For misanthropic anti-natalists, the problem isn’t life—it’s us. Benatar, by contrast, is a “compassionate anti-natalist.” His thinking parallels that of the philosopher Thomas Metzinger, who studies consciousness and artificial intelligence; Metzinger espouses digital anti-natalism, arguing that it would be wrong to create artificially conscious computer programs because doing so would increase the amount of suffering in the world. The same argument could apply to human beings.

Like a boxer who has practiced his counters, Benatar has anticipated a range of objections. Many people suggest that the best experiences in life—love, beauty, discovery, and so on—make up for the bad ones. To this, Benatar replies that pain is worse than pleasure is good. Pain lasts longer: “There’s such a thing as chronic pain, but there’s no such thing as chronic pleasure,” he said. It’s also more powerful: would you trade five minutes of the worst pain imaginable for five minutes of the greatest pleasure? Moreover, there’s an abstract sense in which missing out on good experiences isn’t as bad as having bad ones. “For an existing person, the presence of bad things is bad and the presence of good things is good,” Benatar explained. “But compare that with a scenario in which that person never existed—then, the absence of the bad would be good, but the absence of the good wouldn’t be bad, because there’d be nobody to be deprived of those good things.” This asymmetry “completely stacks the deck against existence,” he continued, because it suggests that “all the unpleasantness and all the misery and all the suffering could be over, without any real cost.”

Some people argue that talk of pain and pleasure misses the point: even if life isn’t good, it’s meaningful. Benatar replies that, in fact, human life is cosmically meaningless: we exist in an indifferent universe, perhaps even a “multiverse,” and are subject to blind and purposeless natural forces. In the absence of cosmic meaning, only “terrestrial” meaning remains—and, he writes, there’s “something circular about arguing that the purpose of humanity’s existence is that individual humans should help one another.” Benatar also rejects the argument that struggle and suffering, in themselves, can lend meaning to existence. “I don’t believe that suffering gives meaning,” Benatar said. “I think that people try to find meaning in suffering because the suffering is otherwise so gratuitous and unbearable.” It’s true, he said, that “Nelson Mandela generated meaning through the way he responded to suffering—but that’s not to defend the conditions in which he lived.”

### 2NC---Links

#### The aff’s attempt to apply the scientific method to predictions about international relations can’t be separated from the broader Cartesian understanding of the world it relies on---the attempt to analyse the past, classify problems of the future and explain solutions only recreates the metaphysics that produce their impacts

Alan D. Sokal 94 {The author is a Professor of Physics at New York University. He has lectured widely in Europe and Latin America, including at the Università di Roma ``La Sapienza'' and, during the Sandinista government, at the Universidad Nacional Autónoma de Nicaragua. He is co-author with Roberto Fernández and Jürg Fröhlich of Random Walks, Critical Phenomena, and Triviality in Quantum Field Theory. 11-28-1994. “Transgressing the Boundaries: Towards a Transformative Hermeneutics of Quantum Gravity.” [https://physics.nyu.edu/sokal/transgress\_v2/transgress\_v2\_singlefile.html}//JM](https://physics.nyu.edu/sokal/transgress_v2/transgress_v2_singlefile.html%7d//JM)

It is not my intention to enter here into the extensive debate on the conceptual foundations of quantum mechanics.8 Suffice it to say that anyone who has seriously studied the equations of quantum mechanics will assent to Heisenberg's measured (pardon the pun) summary of his celebrated uncertainty principle: We can no longer speak of the behaviour of the particle independently of the process of observation. As a final consequence, the natural laws formulated mathematically in quantum theory no longer deal with the elementary particles themselves but with our knowledge of them. Nor is it any longer possible to ask whether or not these particles exist in space and time objectively ... When we speak of the picture of nature in the exact science of our age, we do not mean a picture of nature so much as a picture of our relationships with nature. ... Science no longer confronts nature as an objective observer, but sees itself as an actor in this interplay between man [sic] and nature. The scientific method of analysing, explaining and classifying has become conscious of its limitations, which arise out of the fact that by its intervention science alters and refashions the object of investigation. In other words, method and object can no longer be separated.9 10 Along the same lines, Niels Bohr wrote: An independent reality in the ordinary physical sense can ... neither be ascribed to the phenomena nor to the agencies of observation.11 Stanley Aronowitz has convincingly traced this worldview to the crisis of liberal hegemony in Central Europe in the years prior and subsequent to World War I.12 13

#### It’s a necessary implication of the plan

Greene 2 [Joshua David Greene, currently an Assistant Professor of Psychology at Harvard University. “THE TERRIBLE, HORRIBLE, NO GOOD, VERY BAD TRUTH ABOUT MORALITY AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT.” Dissertation presented to Princeton University in candidacy for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. November 2002. <http://www.wjh.harvard.edu/~jgreene/GreeneWJH/Greene-Dissertation.pdf>]

What about “ought” and “should?” These words are more or less equally comfortable in the mouths of deontologists and consequentialists, and, as we would expect, not so bad as “rights” and “duties,” but a bit more dangerous than “good” and “bad.” In asserted contexts one can avoid them by saying “I favor…,” “I’m for,” “I recommend…,” “I support…,” “I’m opposed to…,” or “I’m against…” instead of “We ought to…,” or “He should….,” or “They must….” It’s a bit hard to let go of these words in non-asserted contexts. For example how would a revisionist ask, “Should abortion be legal?” One could ask, “Are we for or against abortion?” but this sounds like a question about our current position, as if our votes have been cast and it’s simply a matter of tallying them. “Shall we allow abortion?” and “Are we to allow abortion?” both sound a bit too realist, not to mention stilted. “Will we allow abortion?” makes it sound like the issue is one of predicting the future. As far as I can see, there is no standard English way of asking the anti-realist question, “Should2 abortion be legal?” or of translating the phrase, “the dispute over whether abortion should2 be legal.” For this reason, revisionists may have to settle for “ought” and “should” for use in non-asserted contexts.

# 1NR

## CP---Futarchy

#### Current governance structures emphasize bunk decision making processes that make resolving complex long-term problems impossible

Boston 14 [Jonathan Boston, Professor of Public Policy, School of Government, Victoria University of Wellington, Fulbright Fellow, American University. Governing for the Future: How to bring the long-term into short-term political focus. November 5, 2014. https://www.american.edu/spa/cep/upload/jonathan-boston-lecture-american-university.pdf]

Similarly, particular kinds of policy problems pose especially serious challenges for prudent long-term governance. The most difficult problems are those exhibiting one or more of the following characteristics: high complexity; low predictability and causal certainty; spatially dispersed effects; impacts that are mostly experienced in the future and/or are largely invisible and intangible (thus reducing the apparent urgency to respond); impacts that fall predominantly on politically weak or marginalized groups; and, as noted earlier, problems which require investment-type solutions (i.e. up-front costs are required in order to secure long-term benefits). Human-induced climate change exhibits most, if not all, of these features, which helps account for the difficulty of securing prudent policy responses. But many policy problems also exhibit investment-type payoff structures, thus creating a temptation for inter-generational buckpassing. Such temptations will be all the greater when the short-term costs are direct, specific, certain, tangible and visible while the long-term benefits are more generalized, less certain and more intangible.

#### Empirics proves futarchy works better and incorporates all relevant info, including the 1ac’s info

**Hanson 13** Shall We Vote on Values, But Bet on Beliefs?\* ROBIN HANSON Economics, George Mason University http://mason.gmu.edu/~rhanson/futarchy2013.pdf

II. Info Successes of Speculative Markets While government policy may often suffer info failures, speculative markets show striking info successes. Most markets for stocks, bonds, currency, and commodities futures are called speculative markets because they let people speculate on future prices by buying or selling today in the hope of reversing their trades later for a profit. Such opportunities to “buy low, sell high” occur when identical durable items are traded frequently in a market with low transaction costs. Given such opportunities, everyone is essentially invited to be paid to correct the current market price, by pushing that current price closer to the future price. Such invitations are accepted by those sure enough of their beliefs to put their money where their mouth is, and wise enough not to have lost their money in previous bets. Betting markets are speculative markets trading assets designed let people speculate on particular matters of fact, such as which horse will win a race. Final bet asset values are defined in terms of later official judgments about the facts in question. By construction, such assets are durable, identical, and can be created in unlimited supply. Betting and other speculative markets have been around for centuries, and for decades academics have studied their info properties. The main robust and consistent finding is that it is usually quite hard, though not impossible, to find info not yet incorporated in speculative market prices.xvi In laboratory experiments, speculative markets usually aggregate info well, even with four ignorant traders trading $4 over four minutes.xvii There are, however, noteworthy exceptions. For example, betting markets typically overestimate low probability, or “long shot,” events, though with low transaction costs specialists usually eliminate this bias. Also, with complex trader info, “info traps” can arise where traders lack info revelation incentives.xviii Such traps can often be avoided by trading in more kinds of related assets. Financial markets also seem to have excess long-term aggregate price variation, such as financial market bubbles, xix though bubbles can be hard to distinguish from rational info responses.xx Risk and delay discourage specialists from correcting such errors, and irrationally risky traders can actually get better returns, if not utility, and so are not selected out.xxi Even if speculative markets are distorted by irrational bubbles, however, no known info institution does better. For example, what other info institution consistently and clearly predicted that we were over-investing during the dotcom or housing bubbles? Yes individual academics or reporters so predicted, but so did individual stock investors. The key issue is not absolute accuracy, but accuracy relative to other institutions, on the same topics, given similar resources. We have some data on this. In addition to lab studies, a few studies directly compare real speculative markets with other real info institutions. For example, racetrack market odds improve on the prediction of racetrack expertsxxii; orange juice commodity futures improve on government weather forecastsxxiii; stocks fingered the guilty firm in the Challenger crash long before the official NASA panelxxiv; Oscar markets beat columnist forecastsxxv; gas demand markets beat gas demand expertsxxvi; betting markets beat Hewlett Packard official printer sale forecastsxxvii; and betting markets beat Eli Lily official drug trial forecasts.xxviii The largest known tests compare bet prices to major opinion polls on US presidential elections. For example, in 709 out of 964 comparisons, bet prices were closer to the final result.xxix This gain comes in part from prices being disproportionately influenced by active traders, who suffer less from cognitive biases.xxx Some have noted that statistical models built from poll data predict past elections better that did betting prices, and could have been used to win bets.xxxi However, if we compare apples to apples, statistical models built from bet prices predict better than statistical models build from polls.xxxii More important, one group’s statistical model on one topic in not a general institution, to which we could return time and again for answers on many disputed policy topics. My claim is not that betting prices are always more accurate than other sources, but that they are a robustly accurate public institution estimating policy-relevant topics. When supported by similar resources and compared on the same topic, they are often substantially better, and only rarely substantially worse, than other info institutions with publicly visible estimates. Speculators provide a valuable service even when they just evaluate other public info institutions, and echo the most accurate of them. My claim also has little to do with any “wisdom of crowds.”xxxiii Speculators tend to rely more on crowds when crowds know more, and on experts when experts know more. Yes, the best track bettors have no higher IQ, xxxiv but speculative markets if anything still over-emphasize experts, both public and private.xxxv Instead, the main reasons for superior speculative market accuracy seem to be incentive and selection effects: stronger accuracy incentives tend to reduce cognitive biases, xxxvi those who think they know more tend to trade more, and specialists are paid to eliminate any biases they can find. These attempted explanations, however, are not the main reason to believe in speculative market accuracy. The main reason is the robust and consistent empirical track record. We want policy-related info institutions to resist manipulation, that is, to resist attempts to influence policy via distorted participation. Speculative markets do well here because they deal well with “noise trading,” that is, trading for reasons other than info about common asset values. When other traders can’t predict noise trading exactly, they compensate for its expected average by an opposite average trade, and compensate for its expected variation by trading more, and by working harder to find relevant info. Theory says that if trader risk-aversion is mild, and if more effort gives more info, then increased noise trading increases price accuracy. And in fact, the most accurate real speculative markets tend to be those with the most noise trading. What do noise traders have to do with manipulators? Manipulators, who trade hoping to distort prices, are noise traders, since they trade for reasons other than asset value info. Thus adding manipulators to speculative markets doesn’t reduce average price accuracy. This has been verified in theory, xxxvii in laboratory experiments, xxxviii and in the field.xxxix

#### The impact is linear and outweighs any individual scenarios

J. Peter **Scoblic and** Philip E. **Tetlock 16**. Scoblic, Fellow in the international security program at New America. "We didn’t see Donald Trump coming. But we could have.". Washington Post. 2-12-2016. <https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/we-didnt-see-donald-trump-coming-but-we-could-have/2016/02/12/46ece26a-d0db-11e5-abc9-ea152f0b9561_story.html>

The answer lies in measuring a forecaster’s performance over many predictions. Do the things you say will happen 5 percent of the time actually happen about that often? Do you assign high probabilities to events that happen and low probabilities to those that don’t, as opposed to playing it safe with middle-of-the-road predictions? By answering these questions, we can find out whose forecasts are generally the most accurate — even if we can’t say they were “right” — and use the results to refine our beliefs and **plan** for the future.

Individuals, businesses and **policymakers** often face choices involving competing priorities and limited resources. Probabilistic predictions, especially from **forecasters** who have proved their accuracy over time, can enable **better decisions**, and **even small improvements** in predictive ability can mark the **difference between** danger and security, recession and growth, **war and peace**. Imagine that the intelligence community had been more circumspect in 2002, saying there was a 75 percent chance that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction (and a 25 percent chance it did not) instead of bluntly stating, “Baghdad has chemical and biological weapons.” Would Congress still have authorized the use of force? No one knows for sure, but lawmakers might have been more cautious. **Decreasing the odds of multi-trillion-dollar mistakes** is not something to sniff at.

What about supposed black swans, though? It’s true that judging the accuracy of forecasts involving extremely unlikely events is harder, because they could take decades or even millennia to play out. But there are still standards we can use to benchmark those odds, especially compared with other unlikely events. So even if we can’t assign an objective probability to an alien invasion, we can presumably say it’s less likely than, say, **war with Russia** and prepare accordingly.

A purely black swan is, by definition, a completely unforeseeable event, and there are relatively few of those. The 9/11 attacks are often cited as an example, but there were many data points suggesting that al-Qaeda wanted to attack the United States and that terrorists might use airplanes as weapons. (Tom Clancy had even published a book in which a pilot intentionally crashes a jetliner into the Capitol.) As the 9/11 Commission Report put it, the attacks “were a shock, but they should not have come as a surprise.”

Likewise, the intelligence community considered the possibility of the Soviets placing missiles in Cuba, of Islamists overthrowing the shah of **Iran** and of the **Soviet Union collapsing** under the weight of communism. That does not mean that its forecasts were accurate! But if these scenarios were **imaginable**, then **they were predictable** in a ballpark probabilistic sense. And the **accuracy of those predictions** could have been used to refine the intelligence community’s models of the world.

Prediction is not positivism: We need to be humble about what we know and what we don’t know — and always remember that a probability is just that. There are limits to our foresight, but **better prediction can reduce the uncertainty that erodes confidence in the future**. Trump is wrong: America doesn’t need to be made great again. But prediction just might make it better.

#### Futarchic implementation is best, the aff gets circumvented

Graham 19 Andrew Graham, 2-13-2019, "Why governments are so bad at implementing public projects," Conversation, Professor, Queen's University, Ontario <https://theconversation.com/why-governments-are-so-bad-at-implementing-public-projects-111223>

As Canada’s federal government starts looking for a replacement for [its failed payroll system](https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/ottawa/ibm-not-bid-phoenix-replacement-1.5006682) and the Ontario provincial government launches yet another [major shake-up of its health-care system](https://www.theglobeandmail.com/canada/article-ontario-government-employee-fired-after-leak-of-fords-health-plan/), it’s useful to remind decision-makers of a long history of failures in major public sector implementations. Research from around the world shows a consistent pattern of failures in public sector policy and project implementation. Yet we continue to embark upon implementation built on bias and faulty logic. So maybe it’s time to better understand the architecture of failure and what can be done to overcome it. Recent publications from Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States deliver some consistent messages. [The Blunders of Government](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1478-9302.12100_82) delves into the many restarts of the UK National Health Service. The [Learning from Failure report](https://www.apsc.gov.au/sites/g/files/net4441/f/learningfromfailure.docx) details major project failures in Australia. In the U.S., [A Cascade of Failures: Why Government Fails, and How to Stop It,](https://www.brookings.edu/research/a-cascade-of-failures-why-government-fails-and-how-to-stop-it/) reports similar themes. In Canada, the [auditor general’s latest reports on the Phoenix pay system](http://www.oag-bvg.gc.ca/internet/English/att__e_43045.html?wbdisable=true) echo the common basis for implementation failure. It’s not often an auditor uses [the phrase “incomprehensible,”](https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/new-brunswick/phoenix-pay-system-alarms-1.4683030) but there it is. When distilling all this research and all these investigations, certain themes are common to them all. First and foremost in the public sector, announcement was equated with accomplishment. This is the equivalent of thinking that just cutting the ribbon is enough. A corollary of this is that most projects get lots of attention by both political and bureaucratic leaders at first, but that attention fades as the boring, detail-oriented work begins and the next issue, crisis or bright shiny object comes along. **‘We design it. You make it work.’** In many cases, there is a cultural disconnect in the project design that prevents bad news from making it to those at the top of the chain of command, minimizes problems that are often warning signs and deliberately downplays operational issues as minor. What can be called the “handover mentality” often takes over between a project’s designers and the people who have to actually implement it and get it up and running. It’s best characterized by the phrase: “We design it. You make it work.” The next element is that when things go wrong, those who speak up about the problems are dismissed, discounted or just plain punished. [This leads to groupthink,](https://www.psychologytoday.com/ca/basics/groupthink) a failure to challenge assumptions and to just go along, even when danger signs are in full sight. Policy designers and those who must implement government projects or infrastructure are often guilty of what’s known as [optimism bias](https://www.behavioraleconomics.com/resources/mini-encyclopedia-of-be/optimism-bias/) (“What could possibly go wrong?”) when, in fact, they should be looking at the end goal. They should be working backwards to identify not only what could go wrong, but how the whole process will roll out. Instead, they focus on the beginning — the announcement, the first stages. We hear the word *complexity* a lot when examining government project failures. Indeed, most of the problems examined in the aforementioned research pointed to the increasing complexity in failed implementations that went well beyond IT, and the failure to map those complexities out. But that complexity increases the risks of some moving part of a government project malfunctioning and shutting down the entire system. **Gears start slipping** People get busy and distracted. If a policy is just the flavour of the week and something else becomes popular next week, the project starts to lose momentum, needed attention, reaction and adaptation to inevitable challenges. The gears start to slip. Then there is the churn of officials. At both the political and bureaucratic level, this is a consistent theme in projects failing or in governments responding poorly to crises as they arise. The champions for a policy simply move on, and their successors are left to decide how much energy to put into someone else’s pet project. Similarly, the rapid turnover of senior managers in government often leaves well-intentioned people to respond to emergencies in areas where they have little experience. An interesting element in all of this research is the confirmation that [cognitive biases](https://www.verywellmind.com/what-is-a-cognitive-bias-2794963) play a significant role in assessing risks in policy implementation in a number of ways, often in the face of a mountain of contrary evidence. Cognitive biases tend to confirm beliefs we already have. Biases block new information. While we need biases to short-hand our interpretation of events, they often filter and discount new information. Our experiences are our greatest asset and greatest liability in this process. The bottom line on the causes of major implementation failure really rests with a culture focused on blame avoidance and getting along. We now know enough to avoid failure, backed by ample evidence that confirms common sense about how to better structure policy, its implementation and our major projects.

#### 2 The perm is intrinsic

Cohen 4 Copyright © 2004, S. Marc Cohen https://faculty.washington.edu/smcohen/320/theseus.html

Plato is probably the source of this “paradoxical” interpretation of Herclitus. According to Plato, Heraclitus maintains that nothing retains its identity for any time at all: “Heraclitus, you know, says that everything moves on and that nothing is at rest; and, comparing existing things to the flow of a river, he says that you could not step into the same river twice” (*Cratylus* 402A). But what Heraclitus actually said was more likely to have been this: “On those who enter the same rivers, ever different waters flow.” (fr. 12) On Plato’s interpretation, it’s not the same river, since the waters are different. On a less paradoxical interpretation, it **is** the same river, in spite of the fact that the waters are different. On both interpretations of Heraclitus, he holds the **Flux Doctrine**: Everything is constantly altering; no object retains all of its component parts from one moment to the next. The issue is: what does Flux entail about identity and persistence? Plato’s interpretation requires that Heraclitus held what might be called the **Mereological Theory of Identity** (**MTI**), i.e., the view that the identity of an object depends on the identity of its component parts. This view can be formulated more precisely as follows: For any compound objects, *x* and *y*, *x* = *y* only if every part of *x* is a part of *y*, and every part of *y* is a part of *x*. I.e., an object continues to exist (from time *t*1 to time *t*2) only if it is composed of all the same components at *t*2 as it was composed of at *t*1. Sameness of parts is a necessary condition of identity.

#### Uncertainty inevitable and links back to the affirmative

Rohit Chopra 20, Commissioner of the Federal Trade Commission, and Lina M. Khan, Academic Fellow at Columbia Law School, Counsel to the Subcommittee on Antitrust, Commercial, and Administrative Law, US House Committee on the Judiciary and Former Legal Fellow at the Federal Trade Commission, “The Case for "Unfair Methods of Competition" Rulemaking”, University of Chicago Law Review, 87 U. Chi. L. Rev. 357, March 2020, Lexis

I. THE STATUS QUO: AMBIGUOUS, BURDENSOME, AND UNDEMOCRATIC?

Antitrust law today is developed exclusively through adjudication. In theory, this case-by-case approach facilitates nuanced and fact-specific analysis of liability and well-tailored remedies. But in practice, the reliance on case-by-case adjudication yields a system of enforcement that generates ambiguity, unduly drains resources from enforcers, and deprives individuals and firms of any real opportunity to democratically participate in the process.

One reason that antitrust adjudication suffers from these shortcomings is that courts analyze most forms of conduct under the "rule of reason" standard. The "rule of reason" involves a broad and open-ended inquiry into the overall competitive effects of particular conduct and asks judges to weigh the circumstances to decide whether the practice at issue violates the antitrust laws. Balancing short-term losses against future predicted gains calls for "speculative, possibly labyrinthine, and unnecessary" analysis and appears to exceed the abilities of even the most capable institutional actors. 1 Generalist judges struggle to identify anticompetitive behavior 2 and to apply complex economic criteria in consistent ways. 3 Indeed, judges themselves have criticized antitrust standards for being highly difficult to administer. 4 And if a standard isn't administrable, it won't yield predictable results. The dearth of clear standards and rules in antitrust means that market actors face uncertainty and cannot internalize legal norms [\*360] into their business decisions. 5Moreover, ambiguity deprives market participants and the public of notice about what the law is, thereby undermining due process--a fundamental principle in our legal system. 6

Decades ago, former Commissioner Philip Elman observed that case-by-case adjudication "may simply be too slow and cumbersome to produce specific and clear standards adequate to the needs of businessmen, the private bar, and the government agencies." 7Relying solely on case-by-case adjudication means that businesses and the public must attempt to extract legal rules from a patchwork of individual court opinions. Because antitrust plaintiffs bring cases in dozens of different courts with hundreds of different generalist judges and juries, simply understanding what the law is can involve piecing together disparate rulings founded on unique sets of facts. All too often, the resulting picture is unclear. This ambiguity is compounded when the Supreme Court assigns to lower courts the task of fleshing out how to structure and apply a standard, potentially delaying clarity and certainty for years or even decades. 8

#### Most policies fail, the aff will too

Muhlhausen 14 David Muhlhausen, 3-19-2014, "Do Federal Social Programs Work?," Heritage Foundation, https://www.heritage.org/budget-and-spending/report/do-federal-social-programs-work

**Conclusion**

Do federal social programs work? Based on the scientifically rigorous multisite experimental evaluations published since 1990, the answer certainly cannot be in the affirmative. Despite the best social engineering efforts, overwhelming evidence points to the conclusion that federal social programs are ineffective.

#### Even data backed policies fail

Todd 17 Benjamin Todd, July 2017, "Is it fair to say that most social programmes don’t work?," 80,000 Hours, https://80000hours.org/articles/effective-social-program/

The vast majority of social programs and services have not yet been rigorously evaluated, and…of those that have been rigorously evaluated, most (perhaps 75% or more), including those backed by expert opinion and less-rigorous studies, turn out to produce small or no effects, and, in some cases negative effects.

#### Most research is false

Ioannidis 5 Why Most Published Research Findings Are False John P. A. Ioannidis August 2005 https://web.archive.org/web/20170619231725/http://faculty.dbmi.pitt.edu/day/Bioinf2118/Bioinf-2118-2013/Ioannidis-journal.pmed.0020124.pdf

Published research findings are sometimes refuted by subsequent evidence, with ensuing confusion and disappointment. Refutation and controversy is seen across the range of research designs, from clinical trials and traditional epidemiological studies [1–3] to the most modern molecular research [4,5]. There is increasing concern that in modern research, false findings may be the majority or even the vast majority of published research claims [6–8]. However, this should not be surprising. It can be proven that most claimed research findings are false. Here I will examine the key factors that influence this problem and some corollaries thereof. Modeling the Framework for False Positive Findings Several methodologists have pointed out [9–11] that the high rate of nonreplication (lack of confirmation) of research discoveries is a consequence of the convenient, yet ill-founded strategy of claiming conclusive research findings solely on the basis of a single study assessed by formal statistical significance, typically for a p-value less than 0.05. Research is not most appropriately represented and summarized by p-values, but, unfortunately, there is a widespread notion that medical research articles should be interpreted based only on p-values. Research findings are defined here as any relationship reaching formal statistical significance, e.g., effective interventions, informative predictors, risk factors, or associations. “Negative” research is also very useful. “Negative” is actually a misnomer, and the misinterpretation is widespread. However, here we will target relationships that investigators claim exist, rather than null findings.